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The European Union had the cleanest power generation mix ever last year. Emissions were 59% lower than in 1990, while negative prices occurred 1,480 times. The average day-ahead wholesale electricity price in the EU declined by 16% from 2023.

2024 was a year of records for the European power sector, according to Eurelectric’s data. The only not-so-bright side was demand. Power demand didn’t pick up since the crisis, primarily due to low industrial consumption, Eurelectric said.

The EU has closed the year with lower electricity prices on average. In 2024, wholesale day-ahead market prices came down to EUR 82 per MWh from EUR 97 per MWh in 2023.

Investments in renewable electricity generation must be complemented by flexible capacity to balance their variability

The average was even lower – EUR 76 per MWh – up until the last quarter of the year, when a surge in gas prices, high winter demand, scarcity of solar power, and windless days brought power prices up, causing several spikes in Germany, Hungary, Romania and Sweden, to name a few, the organization said.

In parallel, negative prices broke a new record this year as they were registered 17% of the time in at least one bidding zone.

“Eurelectric’s data proves once again that investing in higher renewable generation is the right path for a more competitive and decarbonized economy, but it must be complemented by more firm and flexible capacity to balance their variability, limit reliance on costly fossil fuels and contain price spikes,” Eurelectric’s Policy Director Cillian O’Donoghue said.

The lowest emissions from the EU power sector

2024 marked the lowest emissions from the EU power sector. The annual drop was 13%. Renewables contributed 48% of the EU power generation mix, followed by nuclear, at 24% and fossil fuels at 28% – the lowest share ever.

While nuclear remained the single leading technology in producing power, wind kept its lead over natural gas from the past year, the data showed.

According to O’Donoghue, electrification remains to be the low-hanging fruit to decarbonize the EU. “The more you electrify your energy applications the easier you decarbonize, but demand for electricity is not where it should be today,” he added.

Power demand grew by less than 2% and remains lower than pre-crisis levels

Power demand grew by less than 2% from 2023, but it remained lower than pre-crisis levels. Eurelectric attributes some of the reduction to higher energy efficiency and energy savings. However, it said more than 50% of the decline was caused by industrial slowdown.

In Germany, the industry’s power consumption decreased by 13% in 2023 compared to 2021 and is expected to have sunk further in 2024 since industrial production declined 4% year on year, the organization underlined.

It has praised the Clean Industrial Deal as the ideal opportunity to provide new incentives to electrify, such as creating an electrification bank, electrification accelerated areas and de-risking mechanisms for long-term power purchase agreements.

The European Commission has proposed four carbon pricing design options to the contracting parties of the Energy Community – regional market under an emissions trading system (ETS), fixed price ETS, carbon tax and integration into the European Union’s ETS, according to the Impact Assessment for the Establishment of a Regional Emission Trading System in the Contracting Parties of the Energy Community Treaty.

The impact assessment for carbon pricing was presented at a meeting of the Energy Community Ministerial Council in Vienna on December 12.

Ministers representing the contracting parties agreed to analyze the report and communicate the preferred carbon pricing policy scenarios to the European Commission and the Energy Community Secretariat before the next, informal meeting of the Ministerial Council, scheduled for mid-2025.

The Energy Community Secretariat expects the scheme adopted by the end of 2025 in the form of an update to the Energy Community Decarbonisation Roadmap.

Cwetsch: We now enter into the political process

Adam Cwetsch, Head of the Green Deal Unit at the secretariat, said the European Commission presented a list of different options to the contracting parties and that it stressed it isn’t imposing any concrete policy model. The contracting parties have demanded for the report not to focus only on a regional ETS but to go broadly to show the pros and cons of each policy model, he said and added that carbon pricing designs could be mixed in different scenarios.

All the scenarios, in his words, have different potential scopes of carbon pricing. “The analytical process as such has been finalized and now we enter into the political process,” Cwetsch told Balkan Green Energy News.

Some countries have declared their positions. For example, Serbia intends to introduce a carbon tax.

“The contracting parties need to take into consideration the future aspect of joining the EU ETS. It means that what they decide here has to bring them to the trajectory to join EU ETS,” Cwetsch stressed.

Four design options and three scenarios

The impact assessment has analyzed four carbon pricing design options: regional market ETS, fixed price ETS, carbon tax and integration into the EU ETS. For example, every option has a different institutional set-up, ambition level and allowance allocation.

The carbon pricing scheme is modeled in three scenarios, differing in sectoral coverage. The study has designed three main policy scenarios that represent alternative options for carbon pricing, according to the executive summary of the Impact Assessment. Policy scenarios introduce alternative options for carbon pricing starting from 2026. All imply a commitment to drive net greenhouse gas emissions to zero by 2050, according to the presentation.

All three scenarios are compared against a baseline case – status quo

All scenarios are compared against a baseline case, the status quo. It doesn’t include additional carbon pricing policies apart from the ones already enforced by July 2024. The baseline comprises existing policy measures, already in action or announced at the individual level in draft national energy and climate plans (NECPs).

The electricity-only scenario (P1) assumes a single CO2 price for the power sector. It has two pathways: reaching price equivalence with EU ETS by January 1, 2030 (P1A) and a more gradual CO2 price trajectory toward an alignment with EU ETS by 2035 (P1B). The former implies that the electricity sector is exempted from the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) for electricity exports. The P1B scenario entails CBAM costs before 2035, as the CO2 price would be lower than in EU ETS.

Under the CBAM sectors scenario, CO2 pricing would be applied to all sectors

Industrial sectors are not subject to any form of carbon pricing at least until 2030 and therefore bear the full cost of CBAM, similarly to the baseline scenario.

Under the CBAM sectors scenario (P2), CO2 pricing will be applied to all sectors, starting in 2026. It also has two versions: a unified CO2 price for all contracting parties required to reach national climate objectives (P2A) and allocating 50% of the allowances free of charge (P2B) for the transitional period until 2035.

The P2A scenario models a unified CO2 price for all contracting parties with the aim of reaching national climate objectives. The price would be at only 60% of the EU ETS in 2030, inconsistent with the CBAM regulation. The carbon price effectively paid would be deducted from CBAM obligations.

The EU ETS scenario (P3) envisages the integration of contracting parties into the EU ETS by 2030 as part of the broader EU accession process. All contracting parties commit to 2030 climate targets, representing a timely pathway to decarbonization.

Carbon revenues in the period 2026-2035 are estimated at EUR 17 billion to EUR 20 billion in the first scenario, EUR 15 billion to EUR 23 billion in the second one, and EUR 33 billion in P3.

A shift from energy-intensive activities to the production of clean energy fuels and other segments

The report’s authors assessed the impact of the scenarios on CO2 emissions, the power sector, the industrial sector, the cost of power generation, climate targets, gross domestic product, and employment.

Under the baseline scenario, the operation of coal- and lignite-fired plants is extended. The gradual increase in carbon pricing in scenario P2 questions the extension of the operational life of coal power plants and halves their generation by 2030.

EU ETS prices in scenarios P1A and P3 lead to an almost complete replacement of coal by 2035. The results in variant P1B are similar to P2 in 2030, but converge to the results of P1A by 2035.

The impact of carbon pricing on GDP is limited

On average, 2030 electricity generation costs are projected at 13% to 29% above the baseline. They are the highest in scenarios P1A and P3 (29%). P1B and P2A show a mildly lower increase (21%) and variant P2B envisages a rise of 13%, according to the study.

Results at the country level reveal a limited impact of carbon pricing on gross domestic product. It is higher in Kosovo*, Bosnia and Herzegovina (due to higher electricity costs), and Ukraine, with cumulative losses for the period 2025-2040 ranging between 0.4% and 1.7% for the three contracting parties.

Smaller impacts are projected for Albania, Georgia, Moldova, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. For example, Serbia gets significant gains from higher investments and from recycling carbon revenues.

The most negatively affected activities are associated with power generation from coal

In most of the countries there is a shift from energy-intensive activities to the production of clean energy fuels and other segments, such as the production of consumer goods, the report reads.

All scenarios see employment gains throughout the projection period for most contracting parties. P1B and P2B score best per contracting party and as a whole. The most negatively affected activities are associated with power generation from coal, notably coal mining.

Overall employment losses from 2030 to 2040 are minimal compared to the baseline, fluctuating between 0.5% and 1.5% across scenarios, according to the report.

By Eliza Barnea, EUSEW Young Energy Ambassador focuses on the need for a Green and Social Deal in the EU to ensure a just and equitable green transition, balancing climate action with social protection for vulnerable groups.

As the new European Commission takes office, debates regarding the bloc’s priorities for the future in a time of permacrisis are in full swing. From the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the energy crisis and ever-more frequent natural disasters, the events of the past years have kept the EU in a constant stream of crisis response. Yet today’s challenges are structural in nature and long-term in breadth. The cost of living, the international security landscape, the state of democracy and climate change were some of the top priorities that brought people to the polls in the EU election with highest turnout of the past 30 years.

Perhaps the most transformative in its potential impact is the EU ambition to spearhead the transition to climate neutrality. Yet this has been met with mounting frustrations from the part of workers, frustrations which has been exploited by extremist political discourse across Europe. As seen in the results of the recent elections in Romania, the rise of populist movements risks taking us back to square one by questioning the very notion of climate change. The future of the European Green Deal (EGD) and the Fit for 55 package seems still uncertain, yet the need for action is becoming more urgent with every passing moment. According to the Emissions Gap Report published by UNEP in October, the world is on course for a temperature increase of up to 3.1°C. This is more than double the threshold of 1.5°C which governments worldwide committed to upholding almost 10 years ago through the Paris Agreement.

The disastrous effects of climate change have continued to ravage the continent this year, resulting in human and material losses worth tens of billions of euros. As a result, EU election results clearly display the need to better address perceived tensions between environmental objectives and social equity. Climate policy can only work if we also address societal needs.

Climate action and social justice, two sides of the same coin

One poignant example of the interconnectedness between climate action and social justice is the 2024 wave of farmers protests across Europe.  A common point of contention are the strict EU environmental regulations and recently agreed-upon trade deal between the EU and the South American trade bloc Mercosur. According to French farmers, the trade deal will flood the EU market with cheap products, developed with loose environmental standards. In response to the farmers’ discontent, the Commission withdrew the Sustainable Use Regulation proposal, which sought to halve the use of pesticides by 2030 in a bid to build sustainable food production chains and support biodiversity restoration.

But agriculture is not the only strategic sector where the push for faster climate action is disproportionately affecting the most vulnerable. The green transition is a whole-of-economy, generational process, a paradigm shift that will reverberate in local communities as much as in geopolitical dynamics.

Some  important steps have been taken, from the targets to phase-out coal or fossil fuel boilers  to the introduction of the Emissions Trading System for buildings and road transport (ETS2) starting 2027. But while these are essential measures for driving down GHG emissions in the EU, their effect can come as a double-edged sword, to be felt within and beyond the borders. A lack of mitigation of the disproportionate transition costs on the most vulnerable EU citizens bears the risk of further deepening intranational inequalities, fuelling extremism and Eurosceptic sentiments. Outside EU borders, the race to electrification risks displacing polluting activity, driving up environmental and social damage in resource-rich countries and increasing the risk of conflict and displacement in already fragile regions. These are only a few of the negative externalities that cannot be ignored if we want to make the promise of a fairer, greener economic model a reality for all of us and the EU a global leader in the process.

The Social Climate Fund & the Just Transition Fund, an integrated approach to climate action

In this context, it is undeniable that the way forward for the green legislation of the EU executive needs to be a Green and Social Deal, which carefully intertwines social and environmental protection measures along the value chains. EU’s Just Transition Mechanism and the Social Climate Fund are such instruments. If well implemented, they can alleviate the disproportionate impact of green policies on vulnerable groups, while creating opportunities for everyone.

Created in 2023, the Social Climate Fund ((EU) 2023/955) will pool revenues from auctioning allowances from the newly created ETS2 covering CO2 emissions from fuel combustion in buildings, road transport and small industry. It is expected to mobilise over EUR 86 billion over the 2026 – 2032 period, supporting EU countries address the increasing challenge of energy and transport poverty. Tackling the structural causes of energy poverty and providing long-term relief to the most vulnerable is essential for ensuring the legitimacy of one of the most important EU instruments for climate action, the EU Emissions Trading System. Access to these funds will depend on the development of national Social Climate Plans and  payments will be conditioned by social and climate targets.  These must be done in a participatory way, ensuring that interests of those affected are represented and proposed investments respond to local challenges.

Another essential instrument aimed at balancing social equity and climate action is the Just Transition Fund (JTF, (EU) 2021/1056)). Adopted in 2021, the JTF came as an acknowledgment that achieving the bloc’s 2050 objective of climate neutrality will pose disproportionate challenges on regions dependent on declining polluting industries, with highly-specialised workforce and scarce employment alternatives. Part of the Just Transition Mechanism, the JTF has a budget of over EUR 17.5 billion over 2021–2027. It aims to tackle in an integrated manner the cross-sectoral challenges arising in the decarbonisation of mono-industrial regions, and especially coal regions.

JTF are part of the solution for adapting the future policies to the challenges and realities of the green transition

In many ways, the foundational principles of the JTF are part of the solution for adapting the future policies to the challenges and realities of the green transition. With a focus on territoriality and place-based development, JTF’s targeted support was conditioned by the drafting of Territorial Just Transition Plans (TJTPs) at regional level. In line with the Partnership Principle, the drafting and implementation of TJTPs coagulated diverse stakeholders around a common goal. In many ways, the participatory process unlocked by the JTF has created a best practice precedent essential to the success of the green transition, creating the synergies for local ownership and broader public buy-in. The JTF is now laying the foundation for a green economy, in an ambitious approach unimaginable to coal-dependent and mono-industrial regions just a decade ago.

In Latvia, EUR 1.8 million are allocated to improving the skills of local governments and regional specialists and mitigating the socio-economic consequences of climate change. In Greece, the JTF will provide dedicated support to energy communities for developing self-production initiatives in lignite regions. In the Romanian coal-region of Jiu Valley, the JTF will support the development of a robotics hub for youth on the site of a former mine. In September, CEE Bankwatch Network and 41 other European organisations launched a joint statement asking European decision-makers to continue and strengthen the JTF in the next financial period to ensure that “no one is left behind on the EU’s path to climate neutrality”.

The way forward for the green transition

Creating a level-playing field in the green transition must be a priority through the next Multiannual Financial Framework. As the next long-term EU budget will be negotiated, the focus must remain on continuing the ambitious work already started through the EGD.

Areas of prioritisation should centre on providing adequate financing for targeted support with a territorial approach, based on significant social dialogue, collective bargaining and transparent shared management. Protecting those most affected by mainstreaming strong social and environmental conditionalities and addressing the linkages between social and climate change vulnerability must be guiding principles. Accessing public money should also come with public responsibilities towards the common good. This means supporting local authorities with financial and non-financial tools to develop the knowledge necessary to guide their cities and villages towards climate neutrality. Bringing climate action and its benefits closer to the citizens remains essential for ensuring long-term public acceptance and supporting the behavioural change needed to have sustainability embedded as societal value.

Accessing public money should also come with public responsibilities towards the common good

Additionally, efforts must continue to fill the gaps on sustainable food systems and animal welfare, green industrial transformation and green public procurement in line with EGD objectives, especially on efficiency, sufficiency and circularity. Finally, the external footprint on labour rights and environmental protection of EGD policies and trade agreements must receive increased attention if we are to take the lead in the global transition towards sustainability and act as catalyst for security and prosperity.

A just green transition is an unprecedented opportunity for creating the paradigm shift necessary to tackle the triple crisis of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution, in a transformative, rather than reformative manner. As laid out in the Fit for 55 Package, the green transition is “an opportunity to reduce systemic inequality” and bring forward a new economic model that holds the well-being of people and the environment at its core. The mission of advancing this forward-looking political vision must be upheld by European institutions and national governments alike.

The promise of the European Green Deal for a fair transition towards a greener, more equitable economic model is perhaps the most ambitious endeavour undertaken by the EU since its foundational promise. Similarly to when the 1950 Schuman Declaration put forward the proposal for what would become the EU, achieving this momentous objective requires “creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it”. A choice should not have to be made between protecting the environment, the economy or the people. Transforming the economy so it serves all people and our environment, this must be the way forward.

This opinion editorial is produced in co-operation with the European Sustainable Energy Week 2025. See ec.europa.eu/eusew for open calls.

Disclaimer: This article is a contribution from a partner. All rights reserved.

Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is responsible for the use that might be made of the information in the article. The opinions expressed are those of the author(s) only and should not be considered as representative of the European Commission’s official position.

Footballers playing in the 2026 FIFA World Cup could face dangerous levels of heat stress, scientists warn. A new study shows that temperatures at 14 out of the 16 stadiums could reach thresholds at which football governing bodies recommend postponing matches. The most critical period is in the afternoon, when games are usually scheduled.

The 2026 FIFA World Cup will take place in Canada, the United States, and Mexico from June 11 to July 19 next year. Matches are set to be played in 16 cities. Climate change is leading to an increasing number of extremely hot days, which affect daily life and pose challenges for organizing various events, including sports competitions.

In a study by Donal Mullan from Queen’s University Belfast, scientists analyzed meteorological data from the past 20 years to predict how high temperatures might rise at the host stadiums. To assess heat stress, they used the wet-bulb globe temperature (WBGT) method.

Heat stress is the way the human body responds to high temperatures

Heat stress is the way the human body responds to high temperatures combined with other factors such as humidity and wind speed. Prolonged exposure to extreme heat can worsen health conditions and increase the risk of heat-related illnesses such as heat exhaustion and heatstroke. A potentially dangerous level of heat stress is 28 degrees Celsius in WBGT terms.

Findings indicate that the threshold could be reached at 14 out of the 16 stadiums during the tournament. In an exceptionally hot summer, nine stadiums could exceed 28 degrees WBGT for at least half the time, while four could reach an extreme 32 degrees.

“After analyzing 20 years of data, our modeling shows that high temperatures are extremely likely, and these will have a major impact on players,” Mullan emphasized.

Mexico City and Vancouver are the only host cities where WBGT has never crossed the potentially dangerous threshold, according to the study.

Peak temperatures in the afternoon

The study reveals that stadium temperatures are highest in the afternoon, which is also the most common time for scheduling matches. Outside the period, extreme heat levels drop significantly across all locations.

Mullan suggests that the best protective measure would be to reschedule matches outside the hottest hours, especially at stadiums without air conditioning, such as those in Miami and Monterrey.

The previous World Cup, held in Qatar in 2022, was originally scheduled for June and July, when temperatures exceeded 40 degrees, but it was moved to November and December to protect players and fans.

The authors warn that the 2026 tournament could see matches played in conditions exceeding the threshold at which some football governing bodies recommend delaying or postponing games.

For example, Football Australia’s policy is that a match may be delayed or rescheduled if the WBGT reaches 28 degrees Celsius. On the other hand, FIFA guidelines mandate cooling breaks in each half as a protective measure when WBGT is between 28 and 32 degrees. Matches are only rescheduled if WBGT exceeds 32 degrees.

The European Commission intends to propose a delay in the implementation of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) by one year, and to exempt small importers from paying it, according to a leaked draft.

Redshaw Advisors has reviewed a leaked European Commission draft legislative proposal detailing some significant potential changes to how CBAM will operate, the consultancy’s lead CBAM advisor Dan Maleski said in a post on LinkedIn.

Payments under CBAM of the European Union’s tax on imported cement, iron and steel, aluminum, fertilizers, hydrogen, and electricity are scheduled to begin on January 1, 2026. The European Commission is expected to present a package of legislation proposals on February 26 including changes to CBAM.

Dan Maleski said there are three key takeaways.

⁠The start of CBAM certificate sales would be delayed. The obligation to purchase CBAM certificates would be postponed from 2026 to 2027, providing importers with additional time to prepare.

An exemption threshold would be introduced for small importers

Such a change was indicated a month ago. The European People’s Party (EPP), the strongest group in the European Parliament, said the EU should put the CBAM on hold for at least two years and review it. The suggestion is from a document issued after its leaders met in Berlin, and one of them was European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.

The leaked draft includes an exemption threshold for small importers. They are defined as firms annually importing less than 50 tonnes of covered goods or goods with 100 tonnes of embedded CO2.

The outcome would be the exemption of around 90% of importers from CBAM obligations, Redshaw said.

Other drafted changes are predominantly aimed at simplifying compliance and adjusting CBAM’s scope

The modification was floated by European Commissioner Wopke Hoekstra, in charge of climate policy and taxation. He said that over 80% of companies could be exempted, because the remaining ones account for 97% of greenhouse gas emissions.

The commission will apparently seek tougher penalties for deliberate non-compliance. Minor infractions may see reduced fines, but deliberate avoidance tactics such as import splitting would draw three to five times higher penalties, the leaked draft reads.

Other important changes in the draft are predominantly aimed at simplifying compliance and adjusting CBAM’s scope. Among them are a reduction of quarterly certificate holding requirements, exemption for some sub-products and the simplification of the emissions calculations.

Turkey-based Kazancı Holding plans to invest EUR 1 billion in gas power plants, gas and heat distribution grids, Prime Minister of North Macedonia Hristijan Mickoski said. The company operates in the energy sector under the Aksa brand.

Hristijan Mickoski said Aksa Energy is a leading Turkish company in the energy sector with power plants with a capacity of 3,500 MW in eight countries. Kazancı Holding operates in 22 countries on four continents.

The talks are continuing, he stressed and added he is sure that soon there will be an agreement and concrete steps in the implementation of the plan. Of note, in November the prime minister gave a hint about a possible investment of EUR 1 billion in gas power plants.

Mickoski said gas power plants are a long-term solution for air pollution and that the government is negotiating with investors interested in the construction of cogeneration facilities.

The gas, and heat grid connection would be free of charge for households

The two sides are considering cogeneration plants of 500 MW in combined capacity. They would produce 4.1 TWh of electricity and 720 GWh of heat per year.

The construction of a distribution grid for gas and heat is also being discussed with the Kazancı Holding company, according to Mickovski.

In his words, the connection to the gas and heat grids for households will be free of charge. The price of natural gas for households will be significantly lower than the price on the market, he added.

Mickoski stressed the investment is important not only for a long-term solution for air pollution but also for the strength of the country’s energy sector. The prime minister claimed Kazancı Holding wouldn’t receive any new subsidies except from the regular ones for all the investors.

The contract for the gas pipeline with Greece to be signed in March

North Macedonia currently has only one gas pipeline, from Bulgaria, for gas imports. The signing of the contract for an interconnection with Greece is expected very soon and the memorandum was signed for the connection with Serbia.

In April 2021 the government signed a memorandum with Greece on the supply of natural gas via the liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal in Alexandroupolis.

Mickoski said that even with the existing gas pipeline capacity, there is free capacity to implement the investment with Kazancı Holding.

Kazancı: Over the years, we will invest EUR 1 billion

The contract for the construction of the interconnector with Greece will be signed in March, he announced. In his words, it will add three billion cubic meters of natural gas per year.

Cemil Kazancı, President of the Board of Directors of Kazancı Holding, revealed that they discussed potential investments in the production of electricity and heat, as well as in gas pipelines.

The total planned investment over the years will be EUR 1 billion and it will facilitate the country’s safer and more sustainable supply of electricity and heat, Kazancı asserted.