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January 18, 2016

by AEA

Turkey’s Role in Energy Security through Eastern Partnership

Turkey is located between the rich hydrocarbon reserves in the Caspian region and the European markets and thus sits at the intersection of the most feasible energy transit lines. Yet, geopolitics is not the only reason why Turkey is relevant to the EU’s energy interests in the Caspian. Turkey also has significant political capital and economic ties in the Caspian region that the EU can capitalize on to achieve its long-term energy policy objectives.

Despite the fact that the EU and Turkey have a shared interest in energy security, there are at least two major obstacles that have so far prevented the EU and Turkey from effectively coordinating on energy policy. First, the dissimilar and at times incompatible energy interests of the EU members undermine the EU’s capacity to implement a common external energy policy. Unable to speak in one voice, the EU sends mixed signals to its regional partners, including Turkey. Similarly, Turkey tends to prioritize its own short-term national energy interests over the long-term benefits from cooperation with the EU. The prevalence of national interests over communal ones thus generates a credible commitment problem between the EU and Turkey, where parties are unable to make binding promises for cooperation. For the EU and Turkey to establish a working partnership on energy issues, they should arrive at a common understanding whereby each actor not only values long-term cooperation over short-term interests but also trusts that the other side will do the same. Second, the commitment issue is aggravated by the apparently mismatched perspectives that the EU and Turkey adopt on the political implications of energy cooperation. Turkish decision makers hold that Turkey’s position as an energy corridor merits tangible political benefits, most notably concrete progress in Turkey’s accession talks. Even though most EU officials acknowledge that Turkey could be a strategic asset for European energy security, few go so far as to establish a direct issue-linkage between energy and membership. The discordance of the EU’s and Turkey’s expectations regarding the political payoffs of energy cooperation undermines the mutual trust that is required for long-term partnership.

The EaP was introduced as a joint Polish-Swedish initiative in May 2008. The initiative was conceived as a venue for dialogue and cooperation between the EU and the former Soviet states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. The Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, signed on 7 May 2009, stated that the “main goal of the Eastern Partnership is to create the necessary conditions to accelerate political association and further economic integration between the European and interested partner countries” (European Union, 2009). Through the implementation of Association Agreements, the EaP aims to facilitate the social, economic, and political transformation in the six partner states.

The EaP is a multi-dimensional directive, yet energy security has been at the core of the partnership since its inception. The Prague Declaration says, “The eastern partnership aims to strengthen energy security through cooperation with regard to long term stable and secure energy supply and transit, including through better regulation, energy efficiency and more use of renewable energy sources” (European Union, 2009). Energy security is one of the four thematic platforms of the EaP, along with democracy and good governance, economic integration and contacts with people. Two of the six flagship initiatives of the EaP are also energy-related. One of these initiatives concerns the integration of regional energy markets and raising the profile of renewable energy in partner states, whereas the other initiative directly involves the diversification of energy import routes. On 8 May 2009, the very next day following the EaP Summit, the Southern Corridor Summit was held in Prague, where European Commission officials as well as the presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, expressed their “political support to the realization of the Southern Corridor as an important and mutually beneficial initiative” (EU at the UN, 2009). Jose Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, speaking at the summit, underlined that diversification was indeed a priority: “The context of this summit is very clear. Our strategic priority in the EU is to enhance energy security in particular by diversifying the EU’s energy sources and energy routes”.

At the core of the EU’s diversification strategy is the development and integration of multiple pipeline systems under the general framework of the Southern Gas Corridor, which would carry gas to Europe primarily from the Caspian region (possibly from Turkmenistan, Iran, and the Middle East as well), bypassing transit networks owned or controlled by Russia. This grand energy strategy can be traced back to the establishment of INOGATE (Interstate Oil and Gas transport to Europe) in 1995. INOGATE was later expanded through the signing of umbrella agreements in 2001 when 21 countries agreed to cooperate on pipeline development. Through conferences in Baku in 2004 and in Astana in 2006, INOGATE evolved into the primary institutional framework of regional cooperation on energy security and integration of markets. The next major step in building the institutional framework of a European energy policy was the signing of Energy Community Treaty, which entered into force in July 2006, establishing an Energy Community among the EU members as well as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia, Serbia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Yet another landmark was the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007, which included an article on energy policy, calling for solidarity among Member States. In February 2010, the European Commission established a new DirectorateGeneral for Energy, further indicating the significance attached to the issue. The EaP’s energy agenda should thus be considered the latest step in the evolution of EU’s long-standing efforts to resolve the energy security problem.

How severe is the energy security problem of the EU? Europe is an energy-poor region. It possesses only 0.4 per cent of the world’s proved oil reserves but consumes 15.9 per cent. Similarly, 0.9 per cent of world’s natural gas reserves are in Europe while European consumption constitutes 13.9 per cent of the global consumption (BP, 2012). Not only are the hydrocarbon reserves limited but also production is falling. Total energy production in the EU declined by 13 per cent over the last 20 years. Natural gas production in Europe is in decline. Since 2001, EU-28’s natural gas production decreased by 38 per cent while consumption was reduced by only about 7 per cent. This unfavorable supply and demand structure inevitably led to greater import dependency. Europe’s total energy import dependency rose from 47.1 per cent in 2001 to 53.4 per cent in 2012. Europe imports 90 per cent of its oil and 42 per cent of its solid fuels, yet gas dependency is the most alarming. Gas import dependency jumped from 48.8 per cent in 2001 to 65.8 per cent in 2012 (Eurostat, 2014).

EU is following a multifaceted energy security strategy (European Commission, 2014a,b). The union is committed to reducing primary energy consumption by 20 per cent by 2020 (European Commission, 2011). The energy saving measures are helpful but ultimately insufficient to compensate for the decline in production. In 2012, natural gas consumption in Europe declined 9.9 per cent while production fell by 11.4 per cent. It is possible that part of the decline in energy consumption over the past few years is due to the contraction of the European economy since 2008. With economic restoration over the next decade, energy demand will likely increase, unless policy changes produce significant changes in the structure of energy consumption.

Indeed, projections for EU’s natural gas demand for the two decades indicate significant variations based on policy environment and expectations regarding macro-economic performance. According to Eurogas’ Base Case, which assumes no significant departure from current policy and market conditions, EU-27’s natural gas demand will increase from 438 mtoe (million tonnes of oil equivalent) in 2010 to 471 mtoe in 2035 (Eurogas, 2013, p. 3) In the Environmental Case, which assumes a growing share of renewables and a restoration of economic growth in Europe, demand for natural gas will rise to 527 mtoe by 2035, a 20 per cent increase over the 2010 baseline. Only under the Slow Developments Case, which assumes that gas would become less competitive in Europe, will demand decline to 394 mtoe by 2035 (Eurogas, 2013, p. 3). Thus, barring a significant change in policy and market conditions, natural gas will likely remain a key source of energy for Europe over the next two decades.

Similarly, a report published by Fitch Ratings in August 2014 confirmed that Europe will continue to depend on Russian gas supplies “for at least the next decade and potentially much longer” (Fitch Ratings, 2014). According to Fitch Rating’s projections, European gas demand will grow slightly until the mid-2020s and after that, demand growth will once again accelerate as gas-fired electricity generation replaces coal and nuclear capacity. European shale gas, the report indicates, will not be a viable option for another decade when production reaches a critical volume. Even then, shale gas production would most likely be just enough to compensate for the decline in domestic conventional gas production in Europe. The best the EU can hope for, the report concludes, is to avoid significantly increasing gas purchases from Russia. (Fitch Ratings, 2014).

Thus, energy import dependency will likely continue to be a major issue for Europe. Dependency, particularly on a single supplier, is considered a source of economic and political vulnerability in international relations (Waltz, 1970). Dependent countries are highly vulnerable to supply disruptions whether they are of technical or political nature. The 2006 and 2009 gas shortages in Ukraine and 2007 crisis involving Belarus served as bitter reminders that import dependency threatens the material well-being and security of ordinary citizens. Import dependency has negative consequences on the foreign policy capabilities of the dependent country as well. The potential cost of aggravating an energy supplier casts the dependent actor into an involuntarily cooperative role. Foreign policy implications of energy dependency are particularly relevant when the energy exporters are keen on using their market power as a weapon over importers and transit countries (Gereben, 2013; Stegen, 2011). Ukraine Crisis in 2014 evidenced the extent to which energy dependence constrains EU foreign policy.

Given the political and economic costs of energy dependency, the EU has no choice but to seek to diversify its energy suppliers and import routes. The EU has a few alternative natural gas suppliers, including Iraq, Iran and most recently Eastern Mediterranean but none of these alternatives appears to be as readily accessible as the Caspian reserves in the near future. Iraqi natural gas reserves rank 12th in the world (EIA, 2013) but given various infrastructure issues and the continuing political turmoil in the country, Iraq’s natural gas export capacity is currently limited. Importing natural gas from Iran has long been on the agenda of the EU and the most recent problems with the availability of Russian gas have once again brought the issue to the forefront (The Telegraph, 2014). Most European countries are looking forward to the normalization of relations with Tehran, as evidenced most recently by UK’s plans to reopen its embassy in Tehran (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2014). With a treasury badly damaged by the international sanctions, Iran too would be most interested in selling its gas to Europe, arguably more so than selling to Pakistan (Forbes, 2014). While Iranian natural gas reserves, estimated to be the second largest in the world, constitute a viable alternative for Europe, accessing these reserves poses a challenge in the short term. Even if the ongoing negotiations between P5+1 and Iran ultimately succeed in lifting the sanctions on Iranian energy trade, Iran’s South Pars gas reserves require significant development and investment over the next decade. Once developed and rendered available for international trade, Iranian natural gas will likely be transported to Europe via the proposed Persian Pipeline (Iran-Europe pipeline) or possibly a re-animated Nabucco pipeline, both of which are projected to pass through Turkey. Recently discovered gas in the Eastern Mediterranean would also be a welcome addition to Europe’s energy portfolio yet given the disputes over maritime borders in the region (Eissler & Arasıl, 2014), the enduring Cyprus problem and the diminishing of hostilities between Turkey and Israel since the escalation of Turkey-Russia border spat on downing of latter’s Su-24 in Syria (in 2015), it is getting quite clear that Eastern Mediterranean gas may be available for European consumptionin a significant quantities in the future. Though, fingers are crossed.

Given the various political and economic limitations of bringing online the natural gas from Iraq, Iran and the East Mediterranean in the near term, the Caspian region—estimated to hold six per cent of the world’s proven reserves and well-endowed with foreign investment—currently appears to be the most politically and economically feasible option for European diversification strategy.

The Southern Gas Corridor linking Caspian reserves to European markets consists of several existing and projected pipelines. The Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) gas pipeline carries gas from Shah Deniz gas field in the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian Sea to Turkey since late 2006. The current capacity of the pipeline is 8 bcma (billion cubic meters per annum) but with the completion of the phase II of the Shah Deniz project it can be scaled up to 25 bcma. BTE currently supplies Georgia and Turkey but it can be linked to other projects like the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) which will initially carry about 16 bcma of gas from Georgian-Turkish border to Turkish-European border. Depending on the gas flow, the capacity of the pipeline can later be increased up to 60 bcma.

There are several options to further transport the Caspian gas from Turkish territory to European markets. The primary existing route is the Turkey-Greece Inter-connector, which carries up to 12 bcma of natural gas. A key aspect of this project is the extension across Greece to Italy, which will carry Caspian gas deeper into Europe. A few additional routes to transport Caspian gas from Turkey to Europe have been considered. Nabucco West, the revised version of the defunct Nabucco project, was planned to start from the Turkish-Bulgarian border and transport gas from Shah Deniz Gas field phase II via Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary to Austria. Yet Shah Deniz Consortium partners rejected Nabucco West in 2013 and opted for the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) instead. The main supply source of TAP will be the gas extracted from phase II of the Shah Deniz field, which will be carried through Turkish territory via BTE and TANAP. TAP is planned to start at Greece, cross Albania and the Adriatic to reach Italy.

Turkey thus sits at the intersection of the pipelines that constitute the Southern Gas Corridor. Turkey’s relevance to the EU’s energy policy with respect to Eastern Partnership, however, is not limited to Turkey’s fortunate geopolitical position. Secure and reliable access to Caspian hydrocarbon reserves requires not only a network of pipelines but also regional political stability and cooperation between supplier and transit states. Turkey, with its long-standing economic ties in the Caspian region can potentially act as an intermediary between the EU and the partner countries. Turkey has also been willing to contribute to the resolution of the several “frozen conflicts” throughout the region by acting as an interlocutor between the EU and other relevant parties.

Ankara has a standing policy of promoting interdependence among the three South Caucasus states in order to expand their trade and energy ties with Turkey. Georgia is not only a transit corridor of Azerbaijan’s gas, but also a major trade route for Turkish exports to Central Asia. Turkey also has considerable investments in Azerbaijan, Georgian and Abkhazian economies. Pending on the normalization of relations with Armenia and the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border, economic relations with Armenia also hold great promise for Turkey. Turkey can also help the EU in its capacity building efforts in the Caspian region. Turkish state-owned energy companies TPAO and BOTAS are partners in many pipeline projects in the region. Turkey has also recently shown a great deal of interest in investing in upstream development projects in the region. TPAO for instance signed in May 2014 a 1.5 billion USD deal to acquire French Total’s 10 per cent stake in Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz project. In addition to Shah Deniz, TPAO owns shares in the two major fields in Azerbaijan, ACG (6.75 %) and Alov (9 %). Turkey has a strong presence on the ground and Turkish private sector accumulated expertise that is critical for secure and long-term cooperation.

Lastly, Turkey due to its historic ties to the region has considerable political capital in the Caspian, particularly in Azerbaijan, with which Turkey has sustained a very close relationship since its independence. Turkey also cooperated with the US in its efforts to help Georgia build a new state after independence. Given the difficulties that the EU has experienced in politically reaching out to its Caspian partners over the last decade, the EU can benefit from Turkey’s role as a regional interlocutor between Europe and the Caspian partners.

It is evident that the EU and Turkey can both benefit from extending their cooperation on regional energy issues. Despite the commonality of interests, however, EU-Turkey energy cooperation has so far failed to meet mutual expectations. The next section examines how the prevalence of national interests over communal ones and the opposing views on the Turkish and European sides regarding the political implications of energy partnership undermine the ability of these two actors to commit to a more extended form of energy cooperation.

About The Author:

Tolga Demiryol is assistant professor of Political Science in the School of Economics and Administrative Sciences at Istanbul Kemerburgaz University in Turkey. Tolga Demiryol received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Virginia in 2010. Dr. Demiryol specializes in international political economy and security. His recent research focuses on the geopolitics of energy.

Publication Details:

Baltic Journal of European Studies. Volume 4, Issue 2, Pages 50–68, ISSN (Online) 2228-0596, DOI: 10.2478/bjes-2014-0015, November 2014

This work is an abstract form of author’s original work, titled “The Eastern Partnership and the EU-Turkey Energy Relations”which is licensed under Creative Commons 3.0

December 23, 2015

by AEA

TAP awards contracts for Italy onshore construction

Trans Adriatic Pipeline AG (TAP) awarded a contract for the Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) of the Pipeline Receiving Terminal (PRT) and a contract for the EPC of the onshore pipeline in Italy, TAP reported on December 22.

The joint venture comprised of Italian Enereco S.p.a. and Max Streicher S.p.a. has been awarded the contract for the onshore pipeline in Italy, which will connect the project offshore section at the landfall with the PRT.

Italian Renco S.p.a. has been awarded the contract for the Pipeline Receiving Terminal, which is the final element connecting TAP to the Snam Rete Gas network. In addition to receiving natural gas, the PRT will also host the Supervisory Control Centre (SCC).

TAP will transport natural gas from the giant Shah Deniz II field in Azerbaijan to Europe.

The approximately 870 km long pipeline will connect with the Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) at the Turkish-Greek border at Kipoi, cross Greece and Albania and the Adriatic Sea, before coming ashore in Southern Italy.

First deliveries to Europe will follow approximately in early 2020.

TAP’s shareholding is comprised of BP (20 percent), SOCAR (20 percent), Snam S.p.A (20 percent), Fluxys (19 percent), Enagás (16 percent) and Axpo (5 percent).

December 14, 2015

by AEA

Rusia, BE-ja dhe diplomacia e gazsjellësit Kaspik

Gjatë viteve të fundit, dëshmojmë një përkeqësim të rëndë të marrëdhënieve energjitike, ndërmjet Rusisë dhe Bashkimit Evropian (BE-së). Çështja mbi gazin, është një çështje tepër e rëndësishme, e lidhur ngushtë me përpjekjet e vazhdueshme nga ana e Rusisë për të ri-kalibruar strategjinë e gazsjellësit Euro-aziatik, si dhe orvatjet nga ana tjetër e BE-së për krijuar rrugë të reja furnizimi. Rajoni i Detit Kaspik, tashmë është shndërruar në pikën kyçe të këtyre diskutimeve të nxehta, në fazën e mosmarrëveshjeve serioze, ndërmjet Rusisë dhe BE-së. Ndërkohë që, Azerbaixhani dhe Turkmenistani konsiderohen si partnerë jetik të mundshëm të konsumatorëve Evropian të energjisë, Rusia angazhohet me politikat e saj më agresive, në mbrojtje të interesave të saj kombëtare në rajon. Rivaliteti i vazhdueshëm Rusi- BE, mbi projektet alternative të furnizimit me gaz, jo vetëm që e thellon boshllëkun e marrëdhënieve Bruksel-Moskë, por gjithashtu ka përcjellë ndikimin e saj, ndaj strategjive mbi energjinë të vendeve Kaspike, duke u përpjekur të mos shndërrohet në një fushë-beteje ndërmjet dy aktorëve kryesor.

Konflikti i vazhdueshëm në Ukraninë, si dhe shqetësimet e ngritura, lidhur me sigurinë e furnizuesve të gazit Rus drejt tregut Evropian, kanë përshkallëzuar tensionet ndërmjet Rusisë dhe BE-së, duke arritur nivelin e tyre më të lartë në këto vitet e fundit. Natyra bashkëkohore e marrëdhënieve BE-Rusi mbi energjinë, është rezultati i një kombinimi të ndërlikuar faktorësh gjeopolitikë dhe ekonomikë, të cilët janë të lidhur, ngushtësisht me përfitime të mëdha dhe sigurinë kombëtare. Në thelb të mosmarrëveshjeve aktuale mbi energjinë është një konkurrencë e fortë për qiradhënien e burimeve, ndërmjet prodhuesve të energjisë, konsumatorëve dhe vendeve tranzite ku tek kjo e fundit përfshihet edhe Shqipëria. Ndërlikimet gjeopolitike, aksesi ndaj tregut, modernizimi ekonomik dhe sovraniteti kombëtar, janë disa ndër çështjet kyçe, të cilat kanë ndikuar në politizimin e marrëdhënieve BE-Rusi. Në vijimësi të vënies së sanksioneve nga Perëndimi kundër Rusisë, marrëdhëniet mbi energjinë janë bërë edhe më të ngurta, duke mbyllur të gjitha rrugët e mundshme për të rifituar besimin e humbur nga të dyja palët.
Megjithëse, si Brukseli dhe Moska e kanë mbështetur zyrtarisht de-politizimin e çështjeve mbi energjinë, të dyja palët kanë këndvështrime të kundërta, sesi sektori duhet të organizohet në tërësi. BE-ja kërkon të integrojë Rusinë në sistemin e tregut, ndërkohë që Moska refuzon politikat e vlerave Evropiane, si dhe kundërshton regjimin ekzistues ndërkombëtar të tregtisë energjitike. Nxjerrja e sanksioneve kundër Rusisë, ka rezultuar, si rrjedhojë në një sfidë për politik-bërësit Evropian. Gjithësesi, qasjet e ndryshme dhe interesat kontradiktore, i kanë vënë si Rusinë dhe BE-në përpara rrezikut të konfrontimit, e cila ka gjasa të përçojë një ndikim negativ, lidhur me sigurinë e sektorit energjitik për të dy palët.

Realitetet Aktuale të Bllokimit të Energjisë BE- Rusi

BE-ja, duke qenë se është e përfshirë në liberalizimin e tregut energjitik, aktualisht është duke u përballur me një hendek serioz, ndërmjet zvogëlimit të burimeve vendase dhe kërkesës në rritje të energjisë. Megjithëse, BE-ja përpiqet të promovojë tregtinë e lirë të energjisë përtej kufijve të saj, politikat Evropiane mbi energjitikën mbizotërohen nga interesat kombëtare, duke penguar krijimin e një qëndrim të përbashkët dhe të orientuar strategjikisht ndaj BE-së lidhur me organizimin e tregut energjitik.

Deri më tani, interesat brenda BE-së i kanë penguar Vendet Anëtare, për të formuluar një politikë kohezive dhe të integruar mbi energjinë. Nga ana tjetër, Rusia, ka ndjekur një qasje të ndryshme, lidhur me globalizimin e tregut energjitik, duke kundështuar rolin vetëm të një eksportuesi të thjeshtë të energjisë. Politikat mbi energjinë të zhvilluara nga Rusia, dominohen nga objektivat kyçe strategjik, lidhur me trendet e gjeopolitikës dhe ekonomisë globale, si dhe ndryshimet sociale dhe politike. Kremlini paraqet fuqimisht forcën e tij gjeopolitike, dhe shpesh përdor metoda të ashpra, me qëllim garantimin e interesave strategjik Rus. Megjithatë, mundësia e një rivaliteti vijon të jetë i lartë, për shkak se projektet kryesor mbi investimet dhe rrugët e tubacioneve gazsjellës, kanë ndryshuar ndjeshëm pozicionet ekzistuese të pushtetit.

Qysh prej nisjes së krizës në Ukrainë, drejtuesit e Kremlinit, e kanë rishikuar dukshëm strategjinë mbi tubacionet e gazit të Rusisë. Ndërkohë që, Rusia dominon tregjet e energjisë Evropiane prej mëse shumë vitesh, strategjia e energjisë Ruse, ka pasur ndikimin e saj mbi shumë shtete Evropiane dhe jo-Evropiane, në lidhje me kërkesën, furnizimin dhe tranzitin. Rrugë të reja alternative për gazin dhe naftën, janë gjithësesi jetike për Moskën. Në këtë kuadër, Rusia drejtohet nga Azia, aty ku bashkëpunimi energjitik me Kinën, dukshëm është intensifikuar gjatë viteve të fundit, duke sjellë sfida të reja për konsumatorët Evropian. Me qëllim rivendosjen e statusit të super-fuqisë, Presidenti Vladimir Putin, është i përqëndruar në përdorimin e burimeve natyrale të pamata në vend. Vizioni i ri i Kremlinit, lidhur me tregun global të energjisë, është të rrisë vetë-besimin Rus, nëpërmjet një sërë alternativash të mundshme në Euro-azi.

Nga ana tjetër BE-ja, është duke bërë çdo përpjekje, për të zvogëluar varësinë e saj ndaj Rusisë, duke shumëfishuar burimet e saj të furnizimit me gaz natyral. Megjithëse, disa alternativa janë duke u marrë aktualisht në konsidertë ndaj furnizuesit Rus të gazit, ka shumë pak gjasa që BE-ja të zvogëlojë dukshëm importet e saj të energjisë nga Rusia, në një të ardhme të afërt. Vetë fakti, që Rusia zotëron furnizuesit më të mëdhenj të energjisë në aspektin global dhe tashmë ka një infrastrukturë domethënëse në vend, e shpjegon shumë qartë, pse disa prej kompanive më të mëdha të energjisë në Evropë, ngurrojnë të zhvendosen tërësisht nga status quo-ja. Nuk është çudi, pse këta të fundit kanë interesa të larta financiare, për të mbajtur një furnizim të qëndrueshm të gazit nga Rusia. Megjithatë, BE-ja po përpiqet që të zhvillojë projekte të reja alternative mbi energjinë. Furnizimi me gaz natyral për në tregun Evropian nga rajoni i detit Kaspik dhe në një kohë tjetër zonat gas mbajtëse të Iranit, janë parë për një kohë të gjatë si qëllimi i BE-së, ndaj një përpjekje për të lehtësuar ndopak varësinë Ruse.

Pjesët kryesore të Enigmës Kaspike

Vendet Anëtare të BE-së e kanë njohur rëndësinë gjeopolitike të gjirit Kaspik, duke konsideruar Azerbaixhanin dhe Turkmenistanin si një korridor strategjik, i cili lidh Evropën jugore me Kaukazin dhe Azinë Qendrore.Ndërkohë që jemi në dijeni, të potencialit të pasur që ofrohet nga burimet hidrokarbure të Kaspikut, BE-ja ka realizuar në të njëjtën kohë projekte me investime të reja, të cilat do të ndikojnë në sigurinë dhe qëndrueshmërinë e furnizuesve botëror të energjisë në të ardhmen. Mëse e vërtetë, tashmë që, Azerbaixhani dhe Turkmenistani janë shndëruar në palët kyçe të rajonit të Kaspikut dhe të dy vendet zënë një vend të veçantë në strategjinë e BE-së, lidhur me shumëllojshmërinë e furnizimit me gaz.

Brukseli ka rritur marrëdhëniet me Bakun dhe Ashgabatin, me qëllim aksesin ndaj depozitave të energjisë në Detin Kaspik dhe zvogëlimin e varësisë së Evropës, ndaj importeve të energjisë Ruse. Në vijimësi, BE-ja ka nisur bisedime të drejtpërdrejta mbi projekte ndërkombëtare, të cilat do të mundësojnë furnizimin e konsiderueshëm të energjisë nga gjiri Kaspik drejt tregut Evropian. Gazsjellësi Trans-Anatolian (TANAP) dhe gazësjellësi Trans-Adriatik (TAP) si rezultat, do të japin Korridorin e Gazit Jugor kaq të dëshiruar, e ashtuquajtura si “Rruga e Re e Fildishtë”, për linjat e transportit të energjisë, ndërmjet gjirit Kaspik dhe BE-së. Sapo kjo lidhje jetësore, të fillojë zbatimin në dekadën e ardhshme, do të mundësojë ndaj BE-së importin e gazit natyral nga Azerbaixhani, Turkmenistani dhe mundësisht nga Irani. Përveç kësaj, Brukseli ka nisur një fushtë aktive prapagande për projektin e tubacioneve të gazsjellësit Trans-Kaspik, e i ri-prezantaur kohët e fundit në axhendën e BE-së, për çështjet e energjisë. Tubacioni Trans-Kaspik, do të jetë pjesë e projektit TANAP, i cili është duke u ndërtuar nga Azerbaixhani dhe Turqia. Me shumë gjasa, tubacioni Trans-Kaspik, do të thellojë më tepër aksin lindje-perëndim të marrëdhënieve mbi energjinë, ndërmjet Azerbaixhanit, Gjeorgjisë, Turkmenistanit, Turqisë dhe Vendeve Anëtare në BE.

Pavarësisht kësaj, energjia mbetet një ndër sfidat kryesore për Azerbaixhanin dhe Turkmenistanin, lidhur me politikat vëndase dhe të jashtme, jo vetëm ndaj BE-së, por edhe ndaj vëndeve të tjera, veçanërisht Rusisë. Rrjedhja e plotë e gazit Kaspik në Evropë, parashikon një qëndrueshmëri në këto dy vende, veçanërisht e parë në planin afat-mesëm. Proçeset vendimmarrëse si në Baku dhe Ashgabat(Turkmenistan), shpesh lidhen me zgjidhjen e ekuacioneve rajonale të gjeo-politikës dhe gjeo-ekonomisë. Në realitet, rrugët e tubacioneve TANAP, TAP dhe Trans-Kaspik, janë projekte me risk zero. Disa prej çështjeve të mundshme, lidhur me këto projekte, përfshijnë risqet që kanë të bëjnë më furnizimin, ndërtimin, statusin ligjor të Detit Kaspik dhe çështjet mjedisore, të cilat tashmë janë diskutuar nga ana e Moskës dhe Teheranit.

Furnizimi me gaz natyror, duke rritur ndërvarësinë midis furnitorëve dhe konsumatorëve, e shndërron situatën politikisht më të ndjeshme. Eksporti i burimeve hidrokarbureve nga Deti Kaspik ndaj Evropës, si rezultat do të sfidohet ndaj faktorëve të veçantë, si për shembull interesat gjeo-politke të fqinjve të fuqishëm, duke konkurruar projektet e tubacioneve të gazit, ndryshimet lidhur me rrugët e furnizimit dhe problemet teknike. Për shembull, pengesa kryesore e TAP-it nuk është shtyrja e datës së inagurimit të këtij projekti me një vit më shumë, deri në 2021, por janë kushtet e reja, të cilat janë shtruar në tavolinë nga qeveria Greke.

Direkt pas zgjedhjeve, kryeministri Grek Alexis Tsipras, nisi të fliste për politikat e tubacioneve të gazit. Më 3 shkurt 2015, Greqia deklaroi se do të mbështeste ndërtimin e tubacioneve të TAP-it, përgjatë gjithë territorit të saj, por përfitimet që do t’i sillte Athinës, mund të ishin të pamjaftueshme dhe nisën diskutimet për t’u rishikuar. Në vijim të njoftimit për fillimin e Turkish Stream, Greqia e gjen veten në një pozicion gjeografik strategjik, lidhur me garantimin e energjisë ndaj BE-së. Që atëherë, të dyja tubacionet e gazsjellësit (TAP dhe Turkish Stream) kanë nisur garën, se cila do të ishte e para për të kaluar nga Turqia në Greqi, duke përfituar avantazhet. Në të vërtetë, Tsipras është duke përdorur kartën e tij të fortë, ndaj sigurisë së energjisë në BE. Ai po përdor pozicionin gjeografik të Greqisë, për të vendosur një tarifë më të lartë për TAP-in, megjithëse marrëveshjet nga ri-negociatat do të shkaktojnë hatërmbetje tek qeveria e tij.

Në të njëjtën kohë, projekti i tubacionit të gazsjellësit Trans-Kaspik mund të jetë i zbatueshëm, vetëm nëse Azerbaixhani dhe Turkmenistani do të shfaqin dëshirën për të irrituar Moskën. Kjo varët nga aftësia e të dy vendeve, për t’i rezistuar presionit që mund të vijë nga çdo drejtim, veçanërisht nga Rusia dhe Irani, të cilët në mënyrë të vazhdueshme kanë ngritur për diskutim statusin e pazgjidhshëm të Detit Kaspik, me arsyetimin se ndërtimi i gazsjellësit do të dëmtojë mjedisin e Detit Kaspik.

Gjatë shqyrtimit të politikave shumëdimensionale mbi energjinë, Baku dhe Ashgabat kanë marrë gjithë masat ndaj një sfide me interes të ekulibruar, duke shmangur në të gjitha mënyrat çdo lloj konflikti të drejtpërdrejtë me Mokën, në lidhje me materializimin e Korridorit të Gazit Jugor. Nisur edhe nga shqetësimet politike, as presidenti i Azerbaixhanit Ilham Aliyev dhe as Presidenti i Turkmenistanit Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, nuk mund të ushtrojnë presion më të fortë, sesa ai i ushtruar nga BE-ja, në lidhje me rrugën e tubacionit gazjellës Trans-Kaspik-TAP-TANAP. Të dy Baku dhe Ashgabat janë gati të nisin me implementimin e projektit, por nuk po shohin mbështetjen e mjaftueshme politike, nga ana e BE-së dhe kanë dyshimet, në lidhje me gatishmërinë e BE-së për të kundështuar Moskën, në lidhje me zbatimin e këtyre nismave ndërkombëtare. Si rrjedhojë, efekti i presionit të madh të ushtruar nga Rusia, varet në mënyrë direkte nga rezistenca e frontit të bashkuar të BE-së.

Në mënyrë paradoksale, BE-ja po përpiqet të krijojë një union mbi energjinë, i cili ka për qëllim, miratimin e sa më shumë marrëveshjeve transparente mbi gazin, me qëllim zbehjen e ndikimit Rus. Pavarësisht angazhimeve të fuqishme për të arritur krijimin e një tregu të përbashët energjie, BE-ja deri më tash nuk ka arritur të mundësojë një zgjidhje gjithëpërfshirëse ndaj shumicës së interesave kombëtare konfliktual të Vendeve Anëtare. Për më tepër, mungesa e një integrimi fleksibël, aq shumë të nevojshëm në tregun Evropian të energjisë, i ka dhënë Rusisë më tepër hapësirë për të mavoruar ndaj politikave të tubacioneve gazsjellëse Euroaziatike. Moska po përdor disa taktika të mënçura, duke sugjeruar edhe dhënien e aksioneve ndaj kompanive Evropiane, të përfshira në investimet e projekteve të ndryshme. Rusia, gjithashtu, përdor pushtetin e saj politik për të dekurajuar disa prej shteteve bregdetare të rajonit të Kaspikut, për të mos mbështetur planet e BE-së për shumëfishimin e furnizuesve të gazit.

Nga ana tjetër, për shkak të mungesës së infrastrukturës së përshtatshme, Azerbaixhani dhe Turkmenistani, nuk i përmbushin dot plotësisht kërkesat e BE-së, si dhe nuk ofrojnë aternativa të besueshme ndaj gazit Rus, në një afat të shkurtër kohor. Në planin afatgjatë, megjithëse rrugët e reja duke shmangur Rusinë janë duke u zhvilluar, kapacitetet e eksportit të këtyre dy vendeve bregdetare Kaspike, janë të pamjaftushme për t’u shndërruar në aktorë të fuqishëm lojë, për garantimin e energjisë ndaj BE-së. Përveç kësaj, Korridori Jugor i Gazit mund të sjellë konkurrencë për të gjitha vendet e BE-së dhe të mpijë Rusinë si “armë energjitike”.

Në të njëjtën kohë, Rusia ende mund të kërkojë të shfrytëzojë avantazhet ndaj kostove të saj, duke mbajtur larg tregut Evropian konkurruesit. Moska mund të vazhdojë të shes gazin me çmime të ulta, ndërsa sfiduesit e rinj, si për shembull tubacioni i gazsjellësit nga Turkmenistani, duhet të ofrojnë një çmim më të lartë që të kenë përfitime. Asnjëri prej vendeve, qoftë Azerbaixhani qoftë Turkmenistani nuk do të kenë avantazhe të ngjashme, dhe si rrjedhojë projektet e gazjellësit TANAP, TAP dhe Trans-Kaspik, nuk mund të zëvendësojnë aksionet e Rusisë në tregun e BE-së për gazin natyral. Duke marrë parasysh situatën aktuale financiare globale, shoqëruar me çmimet e ulta të naftës dhe të gazit, është e vështirë të konsiderohet transformimi i rajonit të Detit Kaspik në një nyje traziti për BE-në në të ardhmen.

Siguria e Energjisë së BE-së e mbërthyer midis Manovrës së re të Rusisë dhe Problemeve të Mbartura

Fusha e shahut shumë-dimensionale, e gazit natyror të Rusisë është lehtësisht e kuptueshme, teksa Moska ka shumë interesa ekonomike dhe gjeopolitike në gjirin e Detit të Zi dhe Kaspik. Ndërkohë që vendet e etura për energji të Evropës Jugore dhe Lindore, po përpiqen që të promovojnë TANAP dhe TAP, me shpresën e përshpejtimit të integrimit të tyre në sistemin energjitik Evropian, Rusia vazhdon të transmetojë sinjale të ndryshme, lidhur me linja të ndryshme të transportit të gazit. Pavarësisht, dozës së rëndë me sanksione nga Perëndimi, Moska ka çuar përpara qëllimin, për të ndërtuar një tubacion me Turqinë, duke pasur një kontroll potencial ndaj nyjës së gazit në kufirin Turko-Grek, për shitjet që do t’i bëhen Evropës.

Rusia dhe Turqia janë partnerë strategjik kyç për shumë vite. Që prej ardhjes në pushtet të Vladimir Putin dhe Rexhep Tayyip Erdogan përpara 15 vitesh, të dyja shtetet kanë krijuar një bashkëpunim të ngushtë, jo vetëm në sektorin e energjisë, por edhe në fusha të tjera, atë të tregtisë, turizmit, ndërtimit, prokurimit të armatimeve dhe investimeve të kapitalit. Inicativa më e fundit e Rusisë, e njohur edhe si “Turkish Stream”, paraqet mundësinë e bllokimit të të gjitha burimeve alternative të gazi, që vijnë nga Turqia për në BE. Nëse, Moska dhe Ankaraja miratojnë marrëveshjen e implementimit të këtij projekti, Turkish Stream paraqet ndërlikim serioze për disa prej Vendeve Anëtare të BE-së, në lidhje me shumëfishimin e furnizuesve të energjisë për në tregun Evropian. Në rast se, projeti implementohet në një afat të shkurtër, gjigandi Rus i energjisë Gazprom, lehtësisht mund të ulë çmimet e gazit krahasuar me kostot e larta të gazit Kaspik në tregun Turk dhe atë Evropian.

Turkish Stream, është një strategji e menduar dhe kalibruar më së miri, nga ana e Presidenit Putin, duke pasqyruar llogaritjet e reja gjeopolitike nga ana e Kremlinit si aksioneri më i madh në lojën Euroaziatike.

Ndërkaq, politika e Presidentit Putin, në lidhje me furnizimin e energjisë, në tregun Evropian duket e sigurt. Moska tashmë sfidon haptazi blerësit e së ardhmës të gazit nga Azerbaixhani, veçanërisht ndaj konsumatorëve, të cilët janë të lidhur direkt me projektin Turkish Stream. Në mungesë të një sfide Evropiane, më të bashkërenduar ndaj sigurisë së energjisë, koncepti i ri i Rusisë, lidhur me gazin ka për qëllim, të ndërtojnë fillimisht Turkish Stream dhe më pas, të pres për ndërtimin e infrastrukturës në Evropë. Ka të gjitha gjasat, se kjo lëvizje, do t’i mundësojë Moskës fitoren dhe t’i sjell shqetësime BE-së, lidhur me zgjidhjen e çështjeve aq të diskutueshme, të cilat mund të përcillen nga ana e konsumatorëve Evropian.

Megjithatë, mbetet interesant fakti se, disa prej vendeve bregdetare Kaspike, janë në gjendje të përdorin shkathtësinë e tyre, lidhur me çështjen e eksporti të energjisë. Për shembull,gjatë viteve të fundit, autoritetet drejtuese në Baku, kanë arritur të mbajnë një qëndrim diplomatik të ekulibruar, pavarësisht interesave gjeopolitike konkurruese, në gjirin e Detit të Zi-Kaspik, duke qenë se Azerbaixhani ofron furnizimin me energji jo vetëm, ndaj Turqisë dhe BE-së, por gjithashtu, edhe ndaj Rusisë dhe Iranit. Azerbaixhani nuk e konsideron Turkish Stream, si një projekt rival për Korridorin e Gazit Jugor. Në fakt, kapaciteti i Turkish Stream mund të përdoret nga Azerbaixhani, duke përdorur mundësinë e transportimit, falë zgjerimit të tubacionit gazsjellës Rusi-Turqi, nëpër territorin e Evropës, duke furnizuar me sasi shtesë të gazit natyror në të ardhmen.

Në të njëjtën kohë, Irani vendi i dytë në botë, që zotëron rezervat e gazit natyror pas Rusisë, do të rishikojë rrugët e ndryshme të eksportit për në Evropë, tani që sanksionet ndërkombëtare janë duke u hequr. Teherani, gjithashtu, mund të shfrytëzojë tubacionin e Turkish Stream, nëpërmjet njërës prej rrugëve të mundshme, nga ku gazi i Iranit në të ardhmen, mund të përçohet pranë konsumatorit Evropian. Paralelisht, marrëveshja më e fundit mbi programin bërthamore të firmosur në korrik e quajtuar P5+1, ka hapur mundësi të reja për zgjerimin e lidhjeve ekonomike ndërmjet Iranit dhe vendeve të tjera fqinje të Kaspikut. Në mënyrë të veçantë, Irani është duke kërkuar për rrugë të reja bashkëpunimi më të ngushtë me Azerbaixhanin, lidhur me eksportin e energjisë. Pasi ti jenë hequr sanksionet deri në Korrikun e 2016, Irani do të jetë në gjendje të përdor, tubacionin Baku-Tbilis-Ceyahan, me qëllim eksportin e naftës së vendit të tij dhe gjithashtu, do t’i bashkohet TANAP, për të transportuar gazin në Evropë në të ardhmen.

Megjithatë, ekzistojnë një sërë arsyesh, përse Irani ka pak gjasa që të eksportojë gazin e vendit të tij në Evropë në një afat të mesëm. Për shkak të situatës shqetësuese, mbi sigurinë në Turqi, ku infrastruktura mbi energjinë, përfshirë këtu, edhe tubacionin e gazit Iran-Turqi, është sulmuar në mënyrë të vazhdueshme nga organizatat terroriste, transportimi i gazit nga Irani për në tregun Evropian do të ishtë një zgjedhje jo e mirë për Teheranin. Pavarësisht se, Irani gëzon burime të shumta të gazit dhe nafës, investime të konsiderueshme dhe një tekonologji e re është e nevojshme, për të përpunuar rezervat e mëdha të energjisë në vend. E fundit por jo më pak e rëndësishme, ka të bëjë me distancat e gjata dhe kostot e larta të tranzitit, Evropa për momenin nuk është përparësia kyçe e Iranit, duke qenë se Irani është i përqëndruar, kryesisht në eksportin e gazit natyror ndaj vendeve fqinje.

Në mënyrë të spikatur, pasiguritë lidhur me Turkish Stream dhe Korridorin e Gazit Jugor, mund të vendosin mbi fatin e rrugëve, që do të ndjekin tubacionet. Megjithatë, mbetet për t’u parë, nëse të dy projektet do të pësojnë fatin e South Stream dhe Nabuccos. Gjithësesi, një gjë është tashmë e qartë: gjithëçka që ndodh sot me politikat mbi gazsjellësit në Euro-Azi, varet nga kërkësa e BE-së për energji në të ardhmen dhe lëvizjet strategjike të Rusisë.

Nga Erlet Shaqe

December 14, 2015

by AEA

Game of Pipelines: Bulgaria and Russia’s Energy Diplomacy

Over the past several decades Bulgaria has been attempting to establish itself as the center of the natural gas route in the Balkans, but so far it has achieved limited success.

Natural gas plays a small role in the country’s domestic energy consumption. Its share of electricity generation stands at 13%, but it is widely used for district heating in urban areas. With very limited domestic supplies of gas, more than 95% of it comes from Russia. The route of the Trans-Balkan pipeline, delivering all imported gas, passes through Ukraine, Moldova, and Romania, and that is a major concern for Bulgaria’s energy security.

In the mid-2000s, Russia’s Gazprom and Ukraine found themselves in a battle over late payments and unfulfilled contractual agreements. Gazprom reduced gas deliveries to Ukraine in order to force them to pay their obligations. Ukraine then diverted volumes for domestic consumption that were supposed to be transited for Europe and the dispute reached a crescendo on January 1, 2006, when Gazprom cut down the entire supply passing through Ukraine. This resulted in disruptions for the European market in the middle of the winter heating season.

Russia controls a 30% share of the total European gas market, but for eastern and southeastern Europe, which are 100% dependent on Russian gas, this disruption was much more severe. There were other similar cut-offs in subsequent years driven by economic and political disputes even before the Crimea crisis.

Ukraine sits in the middle of the gas-transit network that delivers Russian gas to Europe – almost half of the volume supplied to western and southern Europe pass through Ukrainian territory (159.5 bcm capacity). After the disputes over eastern Ukraine and Crimea escalated into an all-out military confrontation in 2014, Gazprom announced that it plans to stop gas deliveries through Ukraine by 2019. There are several alternatives for bypassing Ukraine, but all of them require building new pipelines or expanding existing capacities.

Russia has been working on several projects: Nord Stream 2 – delivering gas directly to Germany through the Baltic Sea; South Stream – delivering gas to southern Europe through the Black Sea and Bulgaria, as well as expanding the pipeline through Belarus (31.5 bcm capacity). At the end of 2014, Russia announced a freeze on its work on South Stream, citing EU regulatory obstacles and at the same time signed a memorandum with Turkey to commence building the Turkish Stream (63 bcm/year). The new project bypasses Bulgaria and sends gas to Europe through Turkey, Greece, Macedonia, Serbia and Hungary. If the project is developed as planned, Bulgaria’s dream of becoming a transit hub will not materialize. After the announced halt of transit through Ukraine in 2019, Bulgaria will also have limited options for securing gas for domestic consumption.

South Stream follows the fate of another widely touted project in the mid-2000s – the Nabucco pipeline, which was supposed to diversify European supply by bringing gas from Azerbaijan. The project was shelved, not unlike South Stream, amidst EU regulatory requirements for third party access (TPA) and by fear that Azeri supply will not be enough to meet the project requirements. The Caspian Sea connector, linking Nabucco to Turkmenistan, would have guaranteed a diversified and plentiful supply for the European market but the project never took off amidst soaring cost estimates and rival Russia-backed projects in the region. Russian opposition for the Caspian Sea connector and the fallout between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan doomed Turkmeni access to European markets. Another possible player, albeit not in the foreseeable decade, could be Iranian gas. An additional connection between Erzrum in Turkey and Iran will have to be built, but it is not guaranteed that Russia will not use the Turkish Stream project as a leverage to prevent Turkey from bringing Iranian gas into the mix. The required pipeline will also have to pass through the restive Kurdish area, where Turkey is waging a mini-war with its Kurdish minority. Both security and political reasons may prevent the building of Iran-Turkey connections. Russia announced a few months ago that Turkish Stream gas would be delivered at 10.25% discount for domestic Turkish consumption. But there is a high probability that the Turkish Stream project will follow the fate of Nabucco or South Stream and that Russia is only using such “virtual” pipelines for political reasons. The fate of Turkish Stream is still unclear amidst the downing of a Russian military plane by Turkey near the Syrian border. Last week, the Russian energy minister Novak announced that talks with Turkey on the future pipeline are suspended. Turkey said that it was seeking alternatives for Russian gas and is looking for other suppliers, referring to Azerbaijan and Qatar. In a joint press conference, Azerbaijan’s President Aliyev and Turkish premier Davutoglu announced the speeding up of the Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline Project (TANAP). The TANAP will be connected to the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) and will deliver gas to Europe through Greece, Albania and Italy.

Both the U.S. and the EU have interests in the diversification of European suppliers of natural gas. Cutting dependence on Russian supplies will give Europe economic and political leverage in dealing with a more aggressive and assertive Russia. Director of the Office of Energy Policy and System Analysis at the US Department of Energy Melanie Kenderdine recently met with the Bulgarian Energy Minister T. Petkova to discuss diversifying Bulgaria’s gas flow from Gazprom. The projects that were discussed involve building inter-connectors with neighboring Greece (IGB) and Romania, allowing hydrocarbon explorations along the Bulgarian coast of the Black Sea and the inclusion of Bulgaria in the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). Russia on the other hand announced that the cancelled South Stream is not dead and Gazprom will continue certain activities on it. The problem with South Stream stemmed from the EU’s Third Energy Package requirements for allowing competitive access to the pipeline by third parties, rules prohibiting ownership of the gas, transit lines, and land by the same operator. Corruption scandals in Bulgaria also contributed greatly to the demise of the project and even forced the EU to cut financial packages for the Bulgarian government. The energy policy of Bulgaria is highly politicized and energy projects are usually dictated by pro-Russian or pro-Western interests. The press has revealed that the entire legislation accompanying the South Stream project passed by the Bulgarian Parliament has been written by Gazprom lawyers. Lack of transparency in contract allocations and project financing forced the EU to take actions against Bulgaria. The day the South Stream was cancelled by Russia, a mysterious run on Corporate Commercial Bank (KTB) ensued. It was the bank responsible for handling the government budget transactions and the financing for the South Stream pipeline. The bank became insolvent and was forced into bankruptcy. The major stakeholder and Chairman of the Supervisory Board Tsvetan Vassilev fled to Serbia and so far has avoided accountability and prosecution in Bulgaria.

Corruption scandals have long plagued Bulgarian politics and they may derail any new major infrastructure projects involving gas pipelines. It is common practice for new governments to terminate contracts signed by previous ones. Lack of political stability and continuity might prove to be the biggest threat to Bulgarian energy security.

The EU’s need for diversifying gas supply away from Russia is no more pressing than in Bulgaria. The country imports almost all of its gas from Russia via the Trans-Balkan pipeline. The route runs through Ukraine and the announcement by Gazprom that they will discontinue shipments through Ukrainian territory after 2019 will have serious consequences for Bulgaria. It is not guaranteed that Russia can afford to bypass Ukraine for now. The Ukrainian pipeline capacity of 159 bcm needs to be replaced. Nord Stream 2 will add about 55 bcm but there are no guarantees that the project will not face the same fate as South Stream. Nord Stream has been concluded as a bilateral project between Russia and Germany and has so far avoided the EU Third Energy Package requirements for competitive third party access.

The lack of interconnections between the North and South European energy markets poses a serious challenge for Bulgaria. If all the other proposed projects (South Stream, Nabucco, Trans-Adriatic Pipeline and TurkStream) remain “virtual,” then Bulgaria will be faced with limited options for securing gas supplies. The interconnector with Greece will allow it to access the LNG port in Kavala (Greece) and the TAP line bringing Azeri gas to Europe, but the 183 km section has been slow to materialize. The bad economic situation in Greece will prevent it from investing in costly new infrastructure projects. Another choice for Bulgaria will be to lift the ban on shale exploration. The ban was instituted thanks to the heavy influence of Russia through its friends in the ultra-nationalistic Ataka party. Northern Bulgaria sits on top of the Carpathian-Balkanian shale basin and there could be significant commercial quantities of domestic gas. The U.S. Energy Information Administration has estimated Bulgarian and Romanian technically recoverable shale gas at 37 Tcf. But the Russia-backed Ataka party managed to institute a ban on shale exploration through fear-mongering, organized protests, and cooperation with environmentalist groups. This virtually sealed the fate of Bulgaria as a guaranteed customer for Russian gas. Russia is also trying to stir up anti-EU frustration in Bulgaria after businesses suffered financial losses. Under pressure from the West, Bulgaria withdrew from two other major Russian-linked projects – the Belene nuclear power plant and the Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline. This has imposed heavy losses both for investors and for the government. The country needs to take a second look into its shale deposits and develop domestic sources of natural gas. Preliminary exploratory work in the Black Sea basin is being carried out currently by Royal Dutch Shell, BP and Statoil ASA. If that produces commercially viable quantities of natural gas, it will alleviate Bulgaria’s energy needs, but in the meantime the government should work to link the country to Greece and Romania in the so called ‘vertical gas corridor.’ In April 2015, the three countries signed an agreement to complete the project by 2018. It will cost about €220 million and will allow the region to work on diversification of supply.

Natural gas accounts for only 13% of Bulgaria’s energy consumption, but nonetheless the country dependence on Russia as a single source to cover the majority of its needs creates a host of energy security implications. Even if relations between the two states remain friendly, Gazprom’s decision to stop gas transit through Ukraine after 2019 poses a serious risk. None of the proposed pipeline projects – South Stream, TurkStream, Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, TurkStream or Nabucco, have so far materialized. In order to diversify its supply, the country should consider lifting the ban on shale exploration, working with Greece and Romania on the vertical gas corridor, exploring its offshore fields, trying to leverage EU funds and lobby for the connecting of the North and South European gas markets through Slovenia.

Even if some of the Russian projects move from the realm of virtual to actual gas pipelines, a diverse supply will only increase the energy security of the country.

By : Boyan Dobrev

November 26, 2015

by AEA

China’s ‘Belt and Road’ Reaches Europe

China will build railways and ports in Central and Eastern Europe as part of its “Silk Road Economic Belt.”

Chinese Premier Li Keqiang hosted 16 European leaders in Suhzou on Tuesday and Wednesday, for the fourth China-Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) summit. The format, which held its first summit in 2012 in Warsaw, Poland, brings together leaders from China and 16 Central and Eastern European states: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia. While this was the fourth annual meeting in the “16+1” format, it was the first to be held in China. Chinese media described the meeting as a “golden opportunity” to deepen cooperation.

For China, Central and Eastern Europe represents its “bridge to Europe” (although individual countries in the region might vie over holding that title for themselves). That’s true in both a political and logistical sense. Diplomatically, China hopes that building up better relations with the CEE states, most of whom are also members of the European Union, can help push forward its overall relations with the EU. Logistically, meanwhile, Central and Eastern Europe will play a crucial role in making sure China’s “Silk Road Economic Belt” reaches its final destination: Western Europe.

As Li put it in his remarks at the summit, “Located at the east gateway to Europe and along the routes of the Belt and Road initiative, CEECs enjoy a distinct advantage for enhancing connectivity.” China wants to work with these states “to build the China-Europe land-sea express line and promote connectivity in Europe.”

With that in mind, it’s no surprise that the China-CEE summit placed a heavy emphasis on infrastructure building. Xinhua, in its summary of the summit, even spoke of “infrastructure-led all-round cooperation” between China and the CEE states. Although it’s received far less attention than China’s offer to build up infrastructure at the other end of the “Belt and Road” (in Central and Southeast Asia, for example), China is also making a bid to help construct railways, roads, and ports in Europe. Li even took the 16 visiting state leaders on a high-speed train ride to demonstrate China’s capabilities.

The main deals that came out of the summit, and the various bilaterals held on the sidelines, were also related to infrastructure. China signed deals with both Hungary and Serbia to build a high-speed rail line between their respective capitals, Budapest and Belgrade, a project first discussed in 2013. Li said that construction will begin before the end of the year, and is slated to be completed by 2017. Xinhua described the new railway as “a fast lane for [the] import and export of products between China and Europe.”

The Hungary-Serbia high-speed railway will be just one part of a larger project, the “land-sea express passage” linking China and Europe that Li mentioned in his remarks. According to a statement from the Chinese government, “This express passage extends from the Piraeus Port of Greece in the south to Budapest of Hungary in the north via Skopje of Macedonia and Belgrade of Serbia.” Though Greece is not part of the China-CEE summit, leaders from the other three European state on the route – Hungary, Macedonia, and Serbia – met with Li and agreed to work together on the project.

Li also announced that China will invest in constructing and upgrading port facilities in the Baltic, Adriatic, and Black Seas. While he did not name any specific ports, Li said that “Croatia, Slovenia, Poland, Latvia and Bulgaria have proposed to strengthen cooperation on port development.” The projects will focus on “production capacity cooperation among the ports and industrial parks of the coastal areas of the Adriatic Sea, the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea,” Li said, adding that China expects “our companies to be the main players in these projects.”

That seems to be a condition for projects to receive Chinese financing. “China will provide preferential financing support for those [projects] that use Chinese products and equipment in production capacity cooperation,” Li said. He also proposed creating a new “16+1 finance company” specifically to financially support such projects “through business means” – thus avoiding violating EU restrictions on sovereign debt.

Many of the CEE states are hoping to use Chinese investment to boost their own economies. Vazil Hudak, Slovakia’s minister of economy, told Xinhua that the scope for cooperation is broad: “The whole region could be interested in larger infrastructure projects like communication, transport or some energy infrastructure between these countries, meaning gas pipelines.”

November 25, 2015

by AEA

Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries

On 24 November 2015, the 4th Summit of China and Central and Eastern European Countries (hereinafter referred to as “CEECs”) was held in Suzhou, China. Premier Li Keqiang of the People’s Republic of China, President Andrzej Duda of the Republic of Poland, Prime Minister Edi Rama of the Republic of Albania, Chairman of the Council of Ministers Denis Zvizdic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Prime Minister Boyko Borisov of the Republic of Bulgaria, Speaker of Parliament Josip Leko of the Republic of Croatia, Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka of the Czech Republic, Prime Minister Taavi Roivas of the Republic of Estonia, Prime Minister Orban Viktor of Hungary, Prime Minister Laimdota Straujuma of the Republic of Latvia, Prime Minister Algirdas Butkevicius of the Republic of Lithuania, Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski of the Republic of Macedonia, Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic of Montenegro, Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic of the Republic of Serbia, Prime Minister Miro Cerar of the Republic of Slovenia, Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Economy, Commerce and Relations with the Business Environment Costin Borc of Romania and Deputy Prime Minister Lubomir Vazny of the Slovak Republic attended the meeting. They expressed appreciation and gratitude to China for the efforts it had made as the host country to ensure the success of the meeting. Representatives of other parties, including the EU, Austria and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, were present as observers.

Participants at the meeting (hereinafter referred to as “the Participants”) commended the substantial progress that had been made in the past year in the cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries (hereinafter referred to as “16+1 cooperation”), in particular in the implementation of the Belgrade Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries (see Annex), welcomed and supported the important agreement between the Chinese and EU leaders on establishing the China-EU Connectivity Platform, as well as on developing synergies between the Belt and Road initiative of China and the Investment Plan for Europe, and between 16+1 cooperation and China-EU relations. The Participants expressed their readiness to seize these opportunities and work together to further advance 16+1 cooperation.

The Participants jointly formulated and issued, on the theme of “New Beginning, New Domains, New Vision” , the Suzhou Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries.

1. The Participants support Latvia in hosting the 5th China-CEEC Summit in 2016.

2. The Participants welcome the Medium-Term Agenda for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries issued during the 4th China-CEEC Summit, and are ready to implement it in light of their respective realities, needs and priorities.

3. 16+1 National Coordinators’ Meetings will be held in China and Latvia respectively in 2016.

4. The Participants support the establishment of a mechanism of quarterly meetings between the Secretariat for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries (hereinafter referred to as “the Secretariat”), its member organizations and CEEC embassies in China. The Participants support more efficient use of the Secretariat’s website.

5. Cooperation on Connectivity

(1) The Participants note that the cooperation document on the Belt and Road initiative was signed between the governments of China and Hungary and that there is an interest to have similar documents between China and other CEECs, with a view to enhancing cooperation on regional connectivity.

(2) The Participants welcome the commencement of the regular express cargo railway transit from China to Poland. The Participants encourage and support similar links between China and other CEECs and appreciate the efforts assuring possibility that the goods could be transported in both directions. The Participants support the further development of the Eurasian Land Bridge and welcome the establishment of logistic centers in CEECs.

(3) The Participants appreciate the major progress that has been made in the modernization of the railway line connecting Budapest and Belgrade and welcome the joint efforts of the relevant parties for early completion of the project.

(4) The Participants welcome China, Hungary, Serbia and Macedonia in organizing the 2nd working group meeting and a workshop under the Framework Agreement on Cooperation in Facilitating Customs Clearance Among the Chinese, Hungarian, Serbian and Macedonian Customs in Budapest in 2016, streamlining customs clearance procedures for goods in transit and means of transport and increasing cooperation on customs clearance facilitation for the China-Europe Land-Sea Express Line.

(5) More CEEC customs are encouraged to take part in the third phase of the China-EU Smart and Secure Trade Lanes Pilot Project.

(6) The Participants welcome and support Serbia in leading the efforts to establish a China-CEEC association on transport and infrastructure cooperation and welcome the participation of relevant Chinese and CEEC institutions, businesses and organizations on a voluntary basis.

(7) The Participants welcome and support Latvia in leading the efforts to establish a China-CEEC secretariat on logistics cooperation and welcome the participation of relevant Chinese and CEEC institutions, businesses and organizations on a voluntary basis.

(8) The Participants welcome the relaunch of direct flights between Beijing and Budapest and the launch of direct flights between Beijing and Prague in addition to existing Beijing-Warsaw connection. The Participants support deepening civil aviation cooperation between China and more CEECs.

(9) The 1st China-CEEC Transport Ministers’ Meeting will be held in Riga, Latvia, in 2016.

6. Economic and Financial Cooperation

(1) The 2nd China-CEEC Ministerial Meeting on Promoting Trade and Economic Cooperation will be held in Ningbo, China, in June 2016.

(2) The China-CEEC Investment and Trade Expo will be held in Ningbo, China, in June 2016 during the China International Consumer Goods Fair.

(3) The 3rd Meeting of the China-CEEC Investment Promotion Agencies Contact Mechanism will be held in China in 2016.

(4) The Participants welcome and support Romania’s initiative of setting up a Center for Dialogue in energy-related projects. The 1st meeting of the Center will be organized in Romania in 2016.

(5) The Participants welcome and support the participation of Chinese and CEEC SMEs in the China International Small and Medium Enterprises Fair 2016.

(6) China will attend the Brno International Engineering Fair in the Czech Republic in 2016 as a partner country.

(7) The China Investment Forum will be held in the Czech Republic in 2016.

(8) The Participants welcome and support the organization of an economic forum focused on infrastructure, tourism and industrial capacity cooperation between China and CEECs, to be held in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the first half of 2016.

(9) Qualified CEEC financial institutions are welcomed to apply to be indirect participants in the RMB Cross-border Inter-bank Payment System (Phase One).

(10) The Participants welcome the ongoing work leading to the signing of a statement of cooperation on crisis management between the China Banking Regulatory Commission and the Czech National Bank and the signing of an MoU on regulatory cooperation between the China Banking Regulatory Commission and the Polish Financial Supervision Authority.

7. Agricultural and Forestry Cooperation

(1) The 11th China-CEEC Agrotrade and Economic Cooperation Forum will be held in China in 2016, in conjunction with the 2nd meeting of the China-CEEC Association on Promoting Agricultural Cooperation.

(2) An exhibition area will be set aside for top-quality CEEC agro-products at the 14th China International Agricultural Trade Fair to be held in Yunnan Province, China, in the second half of 2016.

(3) The Chinese side will create a free-of-charge exhibition space for top-quality CEEC wines and spirits at the National Agriculture Exhibition Center.

(4) The Participants welcome the signing or the work leading to the signing of the relevant protocols on quarantine of animal and animal-originated products to be exported to China between China and Serbia, Macedonia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Poland and Estonia respectively. The Participants support China and more CEECs in expanding trade of agro-products and food.

(5) The Participants support Slovenia in leading the efforts to establish a China-CEEC coordination mechanism for forestry cooperation. The 1st China-CEEC High-Level Meeting on Cooperation in Forestry will be held in Slovenia in May 2016.

(6) The Participants welcome China and CEECs in signing agreements on strengthening cooperation in water resources and agricultural irrigation.

8. Cooperation on Science, Technology and Health

(1) The 3rd China-CEEC Seminar on Innovation, Technology Cooperation and International Technology Transfer will be held in China in 2016.

(2) The Participants encourage and support the establishment of a virtual China-CEEC technology transfer center, and the role of the secretariat will be assumed by the relevant Chinese and Slovak institutions.

(3) The Participants support the environment protection authorities of China and CEECs in enhancing exchanges under the framework of 16+1 cooperation and discussing the possibility of cooperation with a third party.

(4) The 2nd China-CEEC Health Ministers’ Forum will be held in China in 2016.

(5) CEEC health professionals will be invited to visit China in 2016 and to participate in seminars on global health diplomacy, healthcare system reforms and health promotion, with a view to strengthening academic and professional exchanges.

(6) CEEC medical and health businesses will be invited to China for exhibitions on health services and medical devices, with a view to promoting cooperation in the medical industry.

9. People-to-People Contacts and Cultural Exchanges

(1) The Secretariat will continue to invite senior CEEC officials for a trip to China in 2016.

(2) The 4th China-CEEC Education Policy Dialogue and the 3rd meeting of China-CEEC Higher Education Institutes Consortium will be held in China in 2016.

(3) A China-CEEC forum on cooperation in the field of art and the 2nd China-CEEC Summer Dance Camp will be held in China in 2016.

(4) Famous CEEC artists and composers as well as artistic directors of international opera festivals in CEECs will be invited to visit China in 2016.

(5) The Participants support China and CEECs in carrying out joint projects on translation and publication of each other’s literary works. China welcomes CEECs to be the Country of Honor as a group at the Beijing International Book Fair in 2016.

(6) The 1st China-CEEC Cultural and Creative Industries Forum will be held in Belgrade, Serbia, in 2016.

(7) The 1st China-CEEC Experts’ Forum on Intangible Cultural Heritage will be held in Krakow, Poland, in 2016.

(8) The Participants welcome the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in leading the efforts to establish a China-CEEC think tanks network.

(9) The 4th China-CEEC High-Level Symposium of Thinks Tanks will be held in 2016.

(10) The Participants encourage and support mutual visits by Chinese and CEEC journalists in 2016.

(11) A China-CEEC seminar of sinologists will be held in 2016.

(12) The Participants welcome the organization of the Travel 2016 expo and the related professional conference in March 2016 in Budapest. China will participate in the expo as the Country of Honor. The Participants support the opening of the regional center of the China National Tourism Administration in Budapest.

(13) The 3rd China-CEEC High-Level Conference on Tourism Cooperation will be held in Croatia in 2016.

10. Cooperation at the Local Level

(1) The 3rd China-CEEC Local Leaders’ Meeting and the China (Hebei) International Economic and Trade Fair 2016 will be held in Hebei Province, China, in 2016.

(2) The 2nd working meeting of the China-CEEC Association of Provincial Governors will be held in Hebei Province, China, in 2016.

(3) The Participants encourage and support exchanges and cooperation between mayors of Chinese and CEEC capital cities.

Annex:

Implementation of the Measures of the Belgrade Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries

1. In January 2015, the customs clearance facilitation cooperation mechanism for the China-Europe Land-Sea Express Line among the Chinese, Hungarian, Serbian, Macedonian and Greek Customs was officially established.

2. From February to October 2015, the Chinese Art Festival was held in Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia.

3. In March 2015, the launch ceremony of the Year of Promotion of China-CEEC Tourism Cooperation was held in Budapest, Hungary.

4. In March 2015, the 1st working group meeting under the Framework Agreement on Cooperation in Facilitating Customs Clearance Among the Chinese, Hungarian, Serbian and Macedonian Customs was held in Shanghai, China.

5. In April 2015, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs appointed the Special Representative for China-CEEC Cooperation.

6. In April 2015, the 1st meeting of the China-CEEC Business Council was held in Katowice, Poland.

7. In April 2015, the Riga High Level Conference on Transport and Logistics and the 3rd ASEM Transport Ministers’ Meeting was held in Riga, Latvia.

8. In May 2015, the 1st Customs Control Techniques Workshop for the China-Europe Land-Sea Express Line among the Chinese, Hungarian, Serbian and Macedonian Customs was held in Shanghai, China.

9. In May 2015, the 33rd Meeting of the Central Bank Governors’ Club of the Central Asia, Black Sea Region and Balkan Countries was held in Shanghai, China.

10. In May 2015, the 1st Meeting of China-CEEC Association of Provincial Governors was held in Hebei Province, China.

11. In May 2015, the Beijing-Budapest regular flight was launched.

12. In May 2015, heads of customs of China, Hungary, Serbia and Macedonia met in Xi’an, China, and signed the Cooperation Action Plan for 2015-2016.

13. In May 2015, China and Hungary signed an MoU on nuclear energy cooperation.

14. From May to June 2015, the Chinese Ministry of Culture organized Chinese performing arts organizations to purchase programs from Hungary, Serbia and Romania.

15. In June 2015, a delegation of CEEC journalists visited Zhejiang Province, Henan Province and Beijing, China.

16. In June 2015, the 1st China-CEEC Investment and Trade Expo was held in Ningbo, China.

17. In June 2015, the launch ceremony of the China-CEEC Association on Promoting Agricultural Cooperation and the 1st Meeting of Ministers of Agriculture was held in Sofia, Bulgaria.

18. In June 2015, the 1st China-CEEC Health Ministers’ Forum was held in Prague, the Czech Republic.

19. In June 2015, the 1st TCM center in the Czech Republic was established.

20. In June 2015, the cartoon series Panda and the Little Mole co-produced by China and the Czech Republic was premiered in the Czech Republic.

21. In July 2015, the 5th China-CEEC National Coordinators’ Meeting was held in Beijing, China.

22. In July 2015, a delegation of senior CEEC officials visited Sichuan Province, Yunnan Province and Beijing, China.

23. From July to August 2015, the 1st China-CEEC Summer Dance Camp was organized in Shaanxi Province, China.

24. In August 2015, Bank of China Prague Branch was opened.

25. From August to September 2015, the 2nd China-CEEC High-Level Conference on Tourism Cooperation was held in Bled, Slovenia.

26. In September 2015, the 10th China-CEEC Agrotrade and Economic Cooperation Forum was held in Budapest, Hungary.

27. In September 2015,the 3rd China-CEEC Education Policy Dialogue and the 2nd working consultation of the China-CEEC Higher Education Institutes Consortium were held in Warsaw, Poland.

28. In September 2015, the Beijing-Prague direct flight was launched.

29. In September 2015, the 2nd China-CEEC Seminar on Innovation, Technology Cooperation and International Technology Transfer was held in Bratislava, Slovakia.

30. In October 2015, an exhibition area dedicated to CEECs was created at the 11th China International Small and Medium Enterprises Fair in Guangzhou, China.

31. In October 2015, the Workshop on Customs Clearance Procedures of Transit Goods and Risk Management among the Chinese, Hungarian, Serbian and Macedonian Customs was held in Skopje, Macedonia.

32. In October 2015, a delegation of artistic directors of CEEC jazz festivals visited China.

33. In October 2015, the Seminar on Radio and Television Program Production for Central and Eastern European Countries was held in Shanghai and Hunan Province, China.

34. In October 2015, the 6th China-CEEC National Coordinators’ Meeting was held in Warsaw, Poland.

35. In October 2015, the 2nd China-CEEC Young Political Leaders’ Forum was held in China.

36. In November 2015, the 2nd China-CEEC Cultural Cooperation Forum was held in Sofia, Bulgaria.

37. In November 2015, the China Investment Forum was held in Prague, the Czech Republic.

38. In November 2015, China and Slovenia signed an MoU on the establishment of the China-CEEC coordination mechanism for forestry cooperation.

39. The 3rd China-CEEC High-Level Symposium of Think Tanks will be held in Beijing, China, in December 2015.

40. China and Romania will sign a new agreement on avoidance of double taxation as appropriate; China signed cooperation agreements on education with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania and Romania respectively; China signed cooperation agreements on quality inspection with Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia respectively; China signed documents on cultural exchanges and cooperation with Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia and Poland respectively; China signed with Romania an MoU regarding the relevant nuclear power project.