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September 1, 2015

by AEA

Agriculture and Horticulture Albania

Agriculture and horticulture in numbers

Europe

Agriculture accounts for only a small part of gross domestic production (GDP) in Europe, and it is considered that the overall vulnerability of the European economy to changes that affect agriculture is low (2). However, agriculture is much more important in terms of area occupied (farmland and forest land cover approximately 90 % of the EU’s land surface), and rural population and income (3).

Albania

Agriculture is the most important sector in Albania, in terms of value added and employment. The agricultural sector still accounts for about 58% of employment (14). The main emphasis remains the production of cereals, however its structure has shifted towards supplying animal foodstuffs instead of human consumption. … Livestock constitutes more than half of the total value of agricultural production (1). Agriculture contributes 21% to the country’s GDP (14).

The share of agricultural land represents only 24% of the total area of the country. About 43% of the total agricultural land is in the lowland area, where the productivity potential is relatively high (13).

The proportions of crop and fruit production are 44% and 11% respectively, while livestock production accounts for more than half of total agricultural production (16). The main agricultural products are grains (especially wheat), vegetables, potatoes and beans (37%). Forage crops (maize and alfalfa) are cultivated on about 49% of total farm surface area (13).

Albania can be divided into three agro-ecological zones, based on soil, climatic, topographic, and socio-economic features including access to agricultural services and inputs, and development of markets and infrastructure (15). Each of these zones will be impacted differently by climate change due to variations in climate, biophysical distinctions, and production systems:

Mountain Zone: 1000-2700 m above sea level. Dominated by pastures and forests. Wheat, barley, Rye and various fruits are grown here.
Hill Zone: 400-1000 m above sea level. Field crops and fruit trees are grown extensively throughout this region.
Lowland zone: 0-200 m above sea level. Citrus, fig and olive trees are grown here.

Vulnerabilities Albania

Risks

A recent report evaluated the risks and opportunities for agricultural production in nine zones across Europe (17). For Albania no opportunities and a number ofclimate change risks have been identified:

Crop area changes due to decrease in optimal farming conditions
Crop productivity decrease
Increased risk of agricultural pests, diseases, and weeds
Crop quality decrease
Increased risk of drought and water scarcity
Increased irrigation requirements
Soil erosion, salinization, and desertification
Deterioration of conditions for livestock production
Sea level rise

Crops

The following impacts are likely in relation to annual crops (13):

The total growing season may be reduced for some crops due to the rise in temperature. Cereals would be harvested earlier;
A lack of cold days during December and January could reduce the effects of vernalisation and consequently lengthen the first part of the growing season for winter wheat. Air temperature in April could slow down biomass growth and reduce wheat yield;
The expected increase in temperature will cause faster rates of development and shorten the length of the growing period for some crops, consequently shortening the length of the grain-filling period;
Higher temperatures during the growth season will increase the development rate of all winter crops, which will therefore face extreme events (cold spells) at a later stage when they are more sensitive;
Higher summer temperatures should not be very detrimental to summer crops (with the exception of spring cereals, if subjected to elevated temperatures during the grain-filling period), since they are more resilient than winter crops. Drought could be a major concern in the future;
Higher temperatures will probably be beneficial to grasslands, at least early in the season, through increased early biomass production. Higher temperatures during the summer may decrease the growth capabilities of grass;
Weeds are expected to benefit from higher CO2 concentrations;
In general, higher temperatures may shorten the reproductive cycle of many pests, thus the risk of crop damage from pests and diseases may increase as a result of climate change.

The available water resources will be sufficient for irrigation by 2025. Thus, no considerable impact on the yields of crops like wheat, maize, potato, vegetables, forages (alfalfa etc.) fruit trees etc. may be expected by 2025. But, if appropriate measures will not be taken for the rehabilitation, the maintenance and improvement of the conveyance and distribution systems, the insufficient irrigation would be again a more important restrictive factor to the yield crops, for the other time horizons (the period 2050, 2100) (1).

Referring to the other time horizons, 2050 and 2100, the expected impacts on agriculture to be expected are: the reduction of the extent of arable land, due to soil erosion and alteration; the changes in the growth cycles, harvest time and the quality of the agricultural production, especially along the coastal area, owing to an increase in salinity because of the sea level rise and intrusion of salt water into the soil (1). Soil erosion is a huge problem: 60% of the territory is affected (13).

The direct impacts of changes in temperature and precipitation in the future will be mixed. Climate change is forecast to improve yields of wheat and irrigated alfalfa; to reduce harvests of grapes and olives; and to have relatively modest effects on tomatoes, watermelons, maize, soybean, grassland and non-irrigated alfalfa (13).

Livestock

The direct effects of climate change on the livestock sector, particularly beef cattle, chickens and sheep, could be substantial, reducing productivity by up to 25% by 2050. These effects would be felt gradually over time, however, and farmers have confirmed that they have not seen any immediate effects of climate change on livestock production (13).

Changes in temperature, precipitation and water availability will also affect the livestock sector in terms of animal health, nutrition, husbandry and livestock-related infrastructure. Changing climatic conditions will adversely affect
fodder and forage production and rangeland biomass, which could lead to volatile feed prices, increased competition for community grazing lands and increased water scarcity (16).

Vulnerabilities Europe – Climate change not main driver

Socio-economic factors and technological developments

Climate change is only one driver among many that will shape agriculture and rural areas in future decades. Socio-economic factors and technological developments will need to be considered alongside agro-climatic changes to determine future trends in the sector (3).

From research it was concluded that socio-economic assumptions have a much greater effect on the scenario results of future changes in agricultural production and land use then the climate scenarios (4).

The European population is expected to decline by about 8% over the period from 2000 to 2030 (5).

Scenarios on future changes in agriculture largely depend on assumptions about technological development for future agricultural land use in Europe (4). It has been estimated that changes in the productivity of food crops in Europe over the period 1961–1990 were strongest related to technology development and that effects of climate change were relatively small. For the period till 2080 an increase in crop productivity for Europe has been estimated between 25% and 163%, of which between 20% and 143% is due to technological development and 5-20% is due to climate change and CO₂ fertilisation. The contribution of climate change just by itself is approximately a minor 1% (6).

Care should be taken, however, in drawing firm conclusions from the apparent lack of sensitivity of agricultural land use to climate change. At the regional scale there are winners and losers (in terms of yield changes), but these tend to cancel each other out when aggregated to the whole of Europe (4).

Future changes in land use

If technology continues to progress at current rates then the area of agricultural land would need to decline substantially. Such declines will not occur if there is a correspondingly large increase in the demand for agricultural goods, or if political decisions are taken either to reduce crop productivity through policies that encourage extensification or to accept widespread overproduction (4).

Cropland and grassland areas (for the production of food and fibre) may decline by as much as 50% of current areas for some scenarios. Such declines in production areas would result in large parts of Europe becoming surplus to the requirement of food and fibre production (4). Over the shorter term (up to 2030) changes in agricultural land area may be small (7).

Although it is difficult to anticipate how this land would be used in the future, it seems that continued urban expansion, recreational areas (such as for horse riding) and forest land use would all be likely to take up at least some of the surplus. Furthermore, whilst the substitution of food production by energy production was considered in these scenarios, surplus land would provide further opportunities for the cultivation of bioenergy crops (4).

Europe is a major producer of biodiesel, accounting for 90% of the total production worldwide (8). In the Biofuels Progress Report (9), it is estimated that in 2020, the total area of arable land required for biofuel production will be between 7.6 million and 18.3 million hectares, equivalent to approximately 8% and 19% respectively of total arable land in 2005.

The agricultural area of Europe has already diminished by about 13% in the 40 years since 1960 (4).

Benefits of climate changes

Using the time horizon 1990 as a reference by 2025, the impacts to be expected are: the potential citrus growing area would be adapted to the conditions (temperature and precipitation) in higher elevations about 150 m; the potential olive growing area would be adapted to the conditions (temperature and precipitation) in higher elevations about 150 m ; the potential citrus area would enlarge from about 13,6285 ha (in 1990) to 36,2527 ha; the potential olive area, in which the year 1990 was about 474,993 ha, would be 598,090 ha (1).

In 2050 and 2100 the cultivation of early agricultural products in the open air or in greenhouses will benefit from the increase in winter temperatures (1).

Adaptation strategies

Options for the adaptation of the agricultural sector to climate change are (1,16):

Improve weather and seasonal climate forecasts;
Afforestation and the setting up of the barriers to protect the arable land threatened by soil erosion and alteration;
Planning of agricultural production toward xerophilic crops to allow adaptation to the higher winter and summer temperatures and to the scarcity of water in summer;
Biotechnology development of “designer cultivars” to adapt to stresses of climate change (heat, water, pests and diseases);
Developing improved agronomy and risk management techniques associated with changing sowing dates to reduce moisture stress and changing plant densities;
Increased participation of farmers through Water User Associations;
improving drainage, rehabilitating secondary irrigation capacity, optimising fertiliser and water application, providing more climate resilient seed varieties and the know-how to cultivate them effectively for high yields, and encouraging the wider use of hail nets (13).

Options to address increases in water scarcity in agriculture include (10,16):

Within the agriculture sector efficiency gains, in terms of water use per unit area, of up to 50% are thought to possible through switching irrigations technologies from gravity to drip or sprinkler feed systems;
Implementation of practices to conserve moisture (agro-technique measures like conservation tillage to protect soil from wind and water erosion (= the practice of leaving some of the previous season’s crop residues on the soil surface); retain moisture by reducing evaporation and increasing infiltration of precipitation into the soil);
Establish native varieties of forests or grassland, or to allow natural regeneration;
Small scale water conservation measures;
Other options include changing crop types and management practices to one which are less water demanding and better adapted to climate conditions under water scarcity. In the south of Europe, short season cultivars that are planted earlier are more likely to reach maturity in advance of the arrival of extreme high summer temperatures, thus avoiding injury from heat and water stress (11). The rice sector in Spain, Portugal and Greece is particularly vulnerable (12). Water availability is likely to become the major driver of future land use, precipitating land use changes;
Biotechnology;
Removal of sediments from reservoirs to increase water storage capacity;
Modification of existing infrastructure, including pumping stations, water canals, etc…;
Modernization of on-farm distribution systems.

Options for the adaptation of livestock are (16):

Introduction of more heat-tolerant and drought-resistant breeds of cattle and sheep;
Improved housing for livestock;
Improved nutrient management for livestock;
More advanced health-facilities and techniques for the livestock sector.

A lot of information on adaptation strategies is presented on this website on the pages for other southern European countries such as Spain, Greece and Italy.

Farmers in Albania have not adequately adapted to current changes in the climate. In light of this large “adaptation deficit”, many of the climate adaptation measures implemented will be able to improve resilience to more severe climate impacts in the future (13).

National-level adaptation is a high priority. Policy changes and institutional capacity improvements that could be undertaken immediately include expanding extension service capacity; improving the provision of short-term meteorology forecasts for farmers; and encouraging the consolidation of farmland into larger holdings to facilitate more substantial investments in on-farm technology (13).

According to the Work Bank, the following adaptation measures hold the greatest promise for Eastern European countries, independent of climate change scenarios (18):

Technology and management: Conservation tillage for maintaining moisture levels; reducing fossil fuel use from field operations, and reducing CO2 emissions from the soil; use of organic matter to protect field surfaces and help preserve moisture; diversification of crops to reduce vulnerability; adoption of drought‐, flood‐, heat‐, and pest resistant cultivars; modern planting and crop‐rotation practices; use of physical barriers to protect plants and soils from erosion and storm damage; integrated pest management (IPM), in conjunction with similarly knowledge‐based weed control strategies; capacity for knowledge based farming; improved grass and legume varieties for livestock; modern fire management techniques for forests.
Institutional change: Support for institutions offers countries win‐win opportunities for reducing vulnerability to climate risk and promoting development. Key institutions include: hydromet centers, advisory services, irrigation directorates, agricultural research services, veterinary institutions, producer associations, water‐user associations, agro processing facilities, and financial institutions.
Policy: Non‐distorting pricing for water and commodities; financial incentives to adopt technological innovations; access to modern inputs; reformed farm subsidies; risk insurance; tax incentives for private investments; modern land markets; and social safety nets.

Weather forecasts

The status of most weather services among Eastern European countries has deteriorated considerably in the last two decades, mainly as a consequence of persistent under‐financing during the arduous transition that followed the end of central planning and the break‐up of the Soviet Union. … The perils of a weakening forecast capacity have become evident in Russia’s system, where the share of hazardous weather phenomena that were not picked up and forecast increased from 6% at the beginning of 1990s to 23% only ten years later. … Increased accuracy in forecasting would assist in the timing of fertilizer application and pest and disease control, avoiding over‐application that raises input costs and exacerbates environmental damage. There is abundant evidence that farmers in Tajikistan, Montenegro, Uzbekistan, and Albania would benefit significantly from improved monitoring and forecasting. Forecasts also would enable mitigation of frost damage, which is a serious problem for agriculture in Ukraine, Turkmenistan, Montenegro, Moldova, Armenia, Macedonia, Kazakhstan, and Bosnia, among others. Tools to mitigate the effects of sudden freezes are being developed globally, but cost‐effective application depends on accurate forecasting (18).

References

The references below are cited in full in a separate map ‘References’. Please click here if you are looking for the full references for Albania.

Republic of Albania, Ministry of Environment (2002)
EEA (2006), in: EEA, JRC and WHO (2008)
EEA, JRC and WHO (2008)
Rounsevell et al. (2005)
UN (2004), in: Alcamo et al. (2007)
Ewert et al. (2005), in: Alcamo et al. (2007)
Van Meijl et al. (2006), in: Alcamo et al. (2007)
JNCC (2007), in: Anderson (ed.) (2007)
European Commission (2006), in: Anderson (ed.) (2007)
Anderson et al. (2007)
Maracchi et al. (2005), in: Anderson (ed.) (2007)
Agra Europe (2007), in: Anderson (ed.) (2007)
Diku (2011)
World Bank (2009), in World Bank (2011)
Shundi (2003), in World Bank (2011)
World Bank (2011)
Iglesias et al. (2007), in World Bank (2011)
World Bank Group (2009)

September 1, 2015

by AEA

Climate change Albania

The climate of Albania

Albania has a typically Mediterranean climate characterised by mild winters with abundant precipitation and hot, dry summers. The annual mean air temperature varies widely over the territory from 7°C over the highest zones up to 15°C in the coastal zone. In the south west, temperatures reach up to 16°C. In the lowland, an almost stable distribution of annual mean temperature (between 12 and 14°C) can be observed. The lowest recorded temperature was -25.8°C and the highest 43.9°C (2).

Total mean annual precipitation over Albania is about 1,485 mm per year. The southeast part of the country receives smaller amounts of precipitation (an annual value of up to 600 mm). The highest precipitation total is recorded in the Albanian Alps, where values reach as much as 2,800 to 3,000 mm per year. Another area with abundant rainfall is the mountainous southwest zone, where total precipitation is up to 2,200 mm. Precipitation levels follow a clear annual pattern, with the maximum in winter and the minimum in summer (2).

Air temperature changes until now

In the eastern Mediterranean, the intensity, length and number of heat waves have increased by a factor of six to eight since the 1960s (7).

Precipitation changes until now

Albania belongs to the subtropical Mediterranean climate. It is characterized by mild winters with abundant precipitation and hot, dry summers. The mean annual precipitation total over Albania is about 1,485 mm/year. The highest precipitation total (70%) is recorded during the cold months (October – March). The richest month in precipitation over the whole territory is November, while the poorest are July and August. The number of rainy days (>1.0 mm) per year varies from 80-120 days/year (1).

The southeast part of country receives the smaller amount of precipitation (annual value reach up to 600 mm/year), followed by the Myzeqeja field, that receives about 1,000 mm/year. The highest precipitation total is recorded in the Albanian Alps, whereas the values reach up to 2,800-3,000 mm/year. Another center with abundant rainfall is also the mountainous southwest zone, with a precipitation total up to 2,200 mm/year (1).

Generally, the annual precipitation total shows a slight decreasing trend, mainly due to less precipitation during winter and spring. An exception from this general trend makes autumn, where coastal stations (Shkodra and Vlora) indicates positive trend of precipitation. While Tirana, Korça and Kukesi stations display a very light decreasing trend (1).

Air temperature changes in the 21st century

The climate change scenarios for Albania project an annual increase in temperature up to 1°C, 1.8°C, 3.6°C respectively by 2025, 2050 and 2100 (1). The seasonal temperature and precipitation changes suggest changes towards milder winters, warmer springs, drier autumns, drier and hotter summers. The projected ranges of temperature increase for all seasons are (3):

Season	Increase 2025	Increase 2050	Increase 2100
Annual	0.8 – 1.1°C	1.7 – 2.3°C	2.9 – 5.3°C
Winter	0.7 – 0.9°C	1.5 – 1.9°C	2.4 – 4.5°C
Spring	0.7 – 0.9°C	1.4 – 1.8°C	2.3 – 4.2°C
Summer	1.2 – 1.5°C	2.4 – 3.1°C	4.0 – 7.3°C
Autumn	0.8 – 1.1°C	1.7 – 2.2°C	2.9 – 5.2°C

Likely changes in other climatic parameters are (3):

a higher increase of daily minimum temperatures than maximum temperatures;
a decrease in the number of frost days (with temperatures of ≤-5°C) in high altitudes of four to five days, nine days and 15 days by 2025, 2050 and 2100 respectively;
an increase in the frequency and intensity of heat waves. The number of days with a temperature of ≥35°C is likely to rise by one to two days by 2025, and by three to four days by 2050 compared to the 1951 to 2000 average. By 2100, the expected increase is between five and six days in mountainous areas and up to eight days in lowland areas;

Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East (EMME)

For the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East an analysis was carried out of long-term meteorological datasets (period 1901-2006) along with regional climate model projections for the 21^st century (SRES scenario A1B) (4). The results suggest a continual, gradual and relatively strong warming of the area of about 1-3°C in the near-future (2010–2039), to 3–5°C in the mid-century period (2040–2069) and 3.5–7°C by the end of the century (2070–2099). Daytime maximum temperatures appear to increase most rapidly in the northern part of the region, i.e. the Balkan Peninsula and Turkey. Maximum day time temperature increases more strongly than mean night time minimum temperature (8).

Extremely high summer temperatures are projected to become the norm by 2070–2099; the coolest summers at the end-of-century may be warmer than the hottest ones in the recent past. As an example, the hottest summer on record in Athens in 2007 would be among the 5% coolest ones by the end of the century (4,8). The relatively strong upward trend in the northern parts of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East indicates a continuation of the increasing intensity and duration of heat waves observed in this region since 1960 (5). According to regional climate model results based on the IPCC SRES scenarios A1B, A2 and B2, the number of heat wave days, here defined as days with maximum temperatures exceeding the local 90th percentile of the reference period (1961–1990), typically increases by a factor of 4–10 by the middle and 7–15 by the end of the century, with the strongest increases in the Middle East (8).

Current and future daytime mean temperature trends in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East typically vary from 0.28° to 0.46°C per decade. The largest increases appear in some continental locations such as Belgrade, Sofia, Ankara, Baghdad and Riyadh with trends in excess of 0.4°C/decade. The same analysis was performed for daytime maximum and night-time minimum temperature; for daytime maximum temperature the largest upward trends are calculated for Belgrade, Sofia, Tirana and Ankara with 0.48°, 0.46°, 0.45° and 0.44°C per decade, respectively. For night-time minimum temperature, large positive trends exceeding 0.40°C/decade are derived for Belgrade, Riyadh, Baghdad, Athens, Sofia and Ankara (4,8).

A1B scenario results suggest that by the end of the century, the frequency of very hot days (maximum day time temperature >35°C) may increase up to 1–2 weeks per year in mountainous parts of the northern EMME and by about a month in much of the rest of the region. The frequency of ‘‘tropical’’ nights (mean night time minimum temperature > 25°C) also increases strongly, by nearly a month per year in the Balkans and coastal areas, and more than two months in the Gulf region, exacerbating the daytime heat stress. By the end of the century in most cities, the coolest summers may be warmer than the hottest ones today (8).

Precipitation changes in the 21st century

The climate change scenarios for Albania project an annual decrease in precipitation up to -3.8%, -6.1%, -12.5% respectively by 2025, 2050 and 2100 (1). The seasonal temperature and precipitation changes suggest changes towards milder winters, warmer springs, drier autumns, drier and hotter summers. The projected ranges of changes in precipitation for all seasons are (3):

Season	Change 2025	Change 2050	Change 2100
Annual	-3.4 to -2.6%	-6.9 to -5.3%	-16.2 to -8.8%
Winter	-1.8 to -1.3%	-3.6 to -2.8%	-8.4 to -4.6%
Spring	-1.2 to -0.9%	-2.5 to -1.9%	-5.8 to -3.2%
Summer	-11.5 to -8.7%	-23.2 to -17.8%	-54.1 to -29.5%
Autumn	-3.0 to -2.3%	-6.1 to -4.7%	-14.2 to -7.7%

By 2050, the lowest value of annual precipitation total (about 570 mm) is expected to be registered in the southeast of the country, followed by Myzeqeja zone located in the west, with 950 mm, the southwest area with 2,100 mm. The highest value, about 2,650-2,850 mm, is expected to be registered again over the Alpine zones. The same distribution is likely expected by 2100 (1).

Likely changes in other climatic parameters are (3):

an increase of droughts (number and duration) during the summers due to higher temperatures and potential evaporation that is not balanced by precipitation;
in winter more precipitation in the form of rain rather than snow;
an increase in episodes of intensive rain. The number of days with heavy precipitation (24 hours maximum) compared to the 1951 to 2000 average is likely to increase by one to two days by 2025, by two to three days by 2050, and by three to five days by 2100.

Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East

From the analysis of long-term meteorological datasets (period 1901-2006) along with regional climate model projections for the 21^st century (SRES scenario A1B) a decline of annual precipitation is projected of 5–25% in 2040–2069 and 5–30% in 2070–2099 relative to the reference period 1961–1990 (4,8). The decreases will be particularly large (>15%) in Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestine territories and Syria. As a result of precipitation decrease, and also due to population growth rates, the per capita available internal water resources may decline strongly, for example by 50% or more by mid-century in Cyprus (9).

In the Balkans, Turkey, Cyprus, Lebanon and Israel, the number of rainy days may decrease, e.g. by 5–15 days at mid-century and by 10–20 days per year at the end-of-century (4). This appears to be a continuation of a trend observed in Greece since about 1960 (6).

The intensity of precipitation (maximum amount of rain per day) is expected to decrease except over the northern Balkans and the Caucasus (4).

References

The references below are cited in full in a separate map ‘References’. Please click here if you are looking for the full references for Albania.

Republic of Albania, Ministry of Environment (2002)
Diku (2011)
Republic of Albania, Ministry of Environment (2009), in: Diku (2011)
Lelieveld et al. (2012)
Kuglitsch et al. (2010), in: Lelieveld et al. (2012)
Nastos and Zerefos 2009, in: Lelieveld et al. (2012)
Kuglitsch et al. (2010), in: Coumou and Rahmstorf (2012)
Lelieveld et al. (2013)
Chenoweth et al. (2011), in: Lelieveld et al. (2013)

August 31, 2015

by AEA

Gas diplomacy in the Balkans…

Natural gas diplomacy in the Balkans is set to intensify, the result of more initiatives put forward by the United States and Russia.

In Greece, which has just entered yet another pre-election period, Energy Minister Panagiotis Skourletis met with U.S. Ambassador David Pearce to discuss proposed energy infrastructure projects in the region, namely the Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria (IGB) and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP).

Sources say both sides agreed to speed up the approval process for each project bringing Greece’s proposal to become an energy hub, with increased imports and redistribution of Azeri gas, one step closer to reality. The U.S. diplomat also arranged a meeting between Skourletis and Amos Hochstein, Special Envoy and Coordinator for International Energy Affairs leading the Bureau of Energy Resources (ENR) at the U.S. Department of State. Hochstein is known for spending considerable amounts of time meeting policy makers in Southeast Europe and promoting U.S. energy interests from a national security perspective, which is clearly a geopolitical concern and not one influenced by market forces or business logic.

From this perspective, the upcoming visit to Athens all but guarantees a new round of discussions between the Americans and Greeks. At a May meeting with former Greek Energy Minister Panagiotis Lafazanis, Hochstein publicly disapproved of the proposed Turkish Stream and the envisaged Greek stream offshoot, which would deliver Gazprom’s commodity via the Southern Balkans. He also said the Southern Corridor projects (TANAP & TAP) were realistic while Turkish Stream was not. Sources suggest the State Department is worried about continuous delays to the IGB project, the result of slow decision-making processes in Greece and Bulgaria. Additionally, the American side is also interested in achieving greater understanding of Greece’s energy relations, especially with Moscow.

Nonetheless, the Vedomosti newspaper reported that Greece, FYROM, Serbia, and Hungary are on the verge of signing a joint memorandum of cooperation on Turkish Stream and its Balkan route. Serbian media have already named part of the route as the “Tesla Pipeline” in an obvious attempt to “nationalize” the section that will pass through Serbia. Insiders suggest the Greek, Serbian, and Hungarian foreign ministers will meet in Belgrade in September to announce an agreement that will see the exact route formalized. It should be noted the foreign ministers, not energy ministers, have taken the lead on this file. This is especially relevant to Greece where a schism exists between Skourletis and Foreign Minister Nikos Kotzias in terms of which project should be favoured more.

Meanwhile, Bulgarian Energy Minister Temenuzhka Petkova has announced new efforts to push forward with South Stream, recently telling local media the project still remains a major goal for the country. Kiril Domuschiev, head of the Confederation of Employers and Industrialists in Bulgaria, noted that pipework for South Stream could also be used for Turkish Stream or any other project involving both Bulgaria and Gazprom. He added that no one would stop Bulgaria from doing business with Russia.

All in all, a new round of diplomatic bras de fer commences in the Balkans between the U.S. and Russia whilst the real players, the consumers in major EU markets, eagerly await the completion of their own projects.

August 31, 2015

by AEA

Europe to Fund Balkan Transport, Energy Projects

Following the Vienna summit, the Western Balkans has been promised 200 million euro in co-financing for 10 transport and energy projects, to improve growth and energy security.

After the Western Balkans summit, which took place in Vienna on August 27, it has been announced that European institutions will grant around 200 million euro for 10 transport and energy infrastructure projects in six Western Balkans countries.

The total value of the agreed projects is around 600 million euro and they are to be conducted in Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo and Bosnia.

The projects will be co-financed under the 2015 Instrument for Pre-Accession programme, IPA, and Western Balkans Investments Framework and by European financial institutions such as the European Investment Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, EBRD, and the German government-owned development bank, KfW.

The Western Balkans Investments Framework was developed jointly with the European Commission, the EBRD and the Council of Europe development bank, as well as by EU member states and Western Balkan countries themselves.

Among the projects to be developed with EU financial help are the Albania-Macedonia power interconnection and the grid section of Trans-Balkan Electricity Corridor in Montenegro and Serbia.

Twenty-four different other infrastructure projects were confirmed as of great importance for the region.

Completion of these projects should stimulate GDP growth by 1 per cent in each Western Balkan country and create around 200,000 new jobs in total, Serbian media reported.

Among the so-called “pre-identified” projects are the highway from Nis in Serbia to the Albanian coastal city of Durres through to the Kosovo capital of Pristina and the highway from Croatia to the Greek border via Montenegro and Albania.

The EU will also co-finance the Bosnia-Croatia road interconnection on the Mediterranean corridor as well as the rail interconnection between Serbia and Macedonia.

Western Balkans officials voiced satisfaction with the offer.

Milo Djukanovic, the Montenegrin Prime Minister, said his country stood to get 45 million euro from the EU for improving rail transport and electric transmission.

He said that without economic support from European institutions, the Western Balkans could not truly develop and provide a better life for its citizens.

“I consider this a very valuable contribution of the EU to the further improvement of transport and railway infrastructure,” Djukanovic said.

Mijat Lakicevic, a Belgrade-based economist, said it was a good news that the EU will co-finance some projects since regional transport infrastructure is worse now than it was 20 or 30 years ago. “Infrastructure is a precondition for development,” Lakicevic told BIRN.

On the other hand, he warned that 200 million euro was not enough to go round the entire region.

“We also have a problem with the quality of proposed projects and the region is already faced with unsuccessful and unfinished projects,” Lakicevic said.

The summit in Vienna is a part of the Berlin Process, a five-year process started last August and marked by yearly summits in order to underline the EU’s commitment to enlargement.

The focus of the initiative is on the six Balkan countries that are not yet EU members: Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. The next summit is scheduled for France next year.

August 28, 2015

by AEA

EU Western Balkans boost energy ties

At the Western Balkans Summit in Vienna, European Commission Vice-President for Energy Union Maroš Šefčovič was expected to look for ways to boost energy infrastructure and connectivity as well as regional cooperation. Non-EU members Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, FYROM, Montenegro and Serbia are looking to integrate with the European Union’s energy system.

A European Commission spokeswoman told New Europe on August 27 that the member states agree and endorse five projects, which have been pre-selected by the energy ministers of the Western Balkan countries already, and this list of priority projects will now be consorted on highest level.

These projects are: Albania – FYROM electricity interconnection, Serbia – Montenegro – Bosnia and Herzegovina electricity interconnection, Serbia – Romania electricity interconnection, Trans-Balkan electricity corridor in Serbia and the Serbia-Bulgaria gas interconnection which is linked to the Interconnection Pipeline from Nis in Serbia to Dimitrovgrad in Bulgaria.

“It’s a selection of key projects which are important for the Western Balkan region to interconnect the Western Balkans with the internal markets and to adapt the necessary infrastructure. These are the projects on the table now,” the spokeswoman said, adding that Šefčovič was expected to discuss the energy infrastructure projects on the level of the energy/economic ministers meeting on August 27.

“The energy union does not stop at the Union’s borders. That’s why we spare no effort to better connect the Western Balkans to our own energy systems,” Šefčovič has said.

Independent consultant Peter Poptchev, a long-time Bulgarian ambassador-at-large for energy security, told New Europe on August 27 that the Bulgaria-Serbia Interconnector is vitally important to a fully functioning energy market in Southeast Europe and to the Energy Union in the region.

“This would be the interconnection that would maximise the ‘market opening’ effect of IGB [Interconnector Greece Bulgaria], new LNG terminals in Greece and Croatia and any new long-haul trans-border pipelines like TAP [Trans Adriatic Pipeline], South Stream, Turkish Stream or Eastring. The BSI and other such interconnectivity infrastructure, including, preferably, jointly-owned storage facilities, would help the countries n SEE to move from the present declaratory to a cooperation and gradual integration of substance,” Poptchev said. He added that he favours expanding the capacity of the projected pipeline, which is planned to carry about 1.8 billion cubic metres of gas annually in both directions.

While in Vienna, Šefčovič was also expected to meet Ukrainian Energy Minister Volodymyr Demchyshyn to discuss the resumption of gas talks between Kiev and Moscow, mediated by Brussels. Ukraine wants to top up its gas storage before the start of winter, while Gazprom is under growing pressure due to falling gas and oil prices as well as an anti-trust probe launched by the European Commission against the Russian gas giant.

Šefčovič will meet the Ukrainian Energy Minister later on August 27. “The bilateral gas talks will start very late afternoon and depending on the outcome and the discussions we will issue late night statement on the Ukrainian situation,” the Commission spokeswoman said.

“We don’t have a date for the trilateral yet. The idea is that we talk with the Ukrainian side today. We have a second bilateral with the Russian side on September 11 and only then we will be able to see if there is enough political will to come together in a trilateral meeting. We don’t have a date yet,” she said.

August 28, 2015

by AEA

EU urged to help Western Balkans phase out coal

As leaders meet in Vienna to discuss closer cooperation, they must address the energy transition, argues CAN Europe

The EU should use its influence with Western Balkan states to wean them off coal.

That was the message of Climate Action Network Europe in a report issued to coincide with a summit in Vienna on Thursday.

German chancellor Angela Merkel and EU foreign affairs chief Federica Mogherini assured leaders of the six countries of their commitment to closer integration.

“I see strong political will, both in the region and in Europe, to make this happen,” Mogherini said at the summit.

Coming as at least 20 migrants were found dead in a lorry in Austria, the meeting prioritised efforts to manage the flows of people escaping conflict-hit states in the Middle East and Africa.

But Maros Sefcovic, vice president of “energy union” at the European Commission, was also there to promote cooperation on energy matters.

Membership conditions

Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia are home to 20 million people and have relatively carbon-intensive economies.

All are seeking EU membership, but first they must meet economic and political conditions, including cleaning up their act on human rights.

Brussels should make sure climate action is on the list, CAN argued, to make sure Western Balkan states do not stay locked into polluting coal-based energy systems.

“Recent lack of tangible progress in the accession talks results in the Western Balkan countries losing appetite for much needed energy system reforms,” said Dragana Mileusnic, the NGO’s energy policy coordinator for South East Europe.

“They are locking their dirty energy systems into outdated and heavily polluting coal infrastructure for decades to come.

“Moreover, the EU’s influence in the region is taken over by Chinese investors, participating in nearly every new coal project planned.”

Coal’s share of energy and electricity production in the Western Balkans, EU and OECD (Source: IEA)

All the states except Albania depend on coal for more than half of their electricity generation, with stark health, economic and climate consequences.

Air pollution knocks a third off Serbia’s GDP, according to the World Health Organization, based on the cost of related death and disease.

Yet the country is planning 2.5 gigawatts of coal power plants, more than half its electricity generation pipeline. Across the region, 6GW of power stations are due to be built by 2030.

Many have attracted Chinese investment, while the World Bank is reportedly backing a plant in Kosovo, despite its policy of phasing out coal support.

Share of coal in planned electricity generation capacity (Source: Energy Community, CEE Bankwatch)

As part of its energy union strategy, Brussels is seeking to coordinate with neighbouring states.

While it is supposed to line up with the bloc’s climate policy, the focus has been on energy security and reducing reliance on Russian gas.

On Poland’s insistence, this included a push for “indigenous fuel” such as coal and gas, as well as diversifying gas supply routes.

That dismayed environmentalists, who argued energy efficiency and renewables were the way to go.

Mileusnic of CAN Europe called on Sefcovic to use the Vienna summit to make “more than a cosmetic change” to energy systems in the region.

Report: Europe’s “energy union” leader talks tough on Russia

It should also be pressing Western Balkan states to commit to greenhouse gas emissions cuts in line with EU ambition, CAN said.

National contributions are to form the backbone of a global carbon-cutting deal due in Paris this December.

To date, only Serbia has submitted a climate pledge to the UN, promising to cut emissions 9.8% by 2030 on 1990 levels.

Sefcovic hailed the move as “an exemplary step” on the path to EU membership.

But CAN said the figure was “far too low” and not compatible with the rest of the continent.

The EU is committed to 40% cuts, with even the poorest member states targeting at least 25% as their share.

By Megan Darby